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Abstract  
This project examines the hypothesis set forth by Halvor Mehlum, Karl Moene and Ragnar Torvik., 
that institutional quality determines whether natural resource abundance becomes a blessing or a curse, 
by analysing the quality of institutions in the resource abundant Sub-Saharan country of Angola. By 
operationalizing institutional quality into the rule of law, bureaucratic quality, corruption and the 
business environment in Angola, both quantitative and qualitative data is applied, in order to analyse 
in-depth the impact of institutions. This project finds, that the institutions of Angola can be 
characterized as grabber-friendly, and see little structural transformation in the country, but that the 
economic growth in the period 2006 – 2013, cannot be accounted for by the hypothesis. Therefore it is 
concluded, that the hypothesis of Mehlum et al. lacks explanatory power to demonstrate why Angola 
has good growth rates, while exhibiting bad quality institutions.  
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1.0 Introduction 
It is the perfect paradox: resource abundant countries struggle with lower growth rates and a weaker 
performance of democracy, than countries without significant resources. This seems to apply especially 
when the particular resource is a point resource (for example oil or gas), although extractive energy 
commodities have a growing demand on global markets (Bulte et al., 2005:1029-1031; Auty, 2001:6). 
What scholars classically coined as the “Resource Curse” – a symbiosis of many factors determining 
the poor economic performance of resource abundant countries – has generally been considered a 
reasonable explanation for this conundrum. 
 
We find it puzzling that natural resources in many cases, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, do not 
constitute a blessing to these countries, and how some countries have succeeded in avoiding the curse. 
The resource curse literature does provide explanations for this paradox, however some gaps are 
evident (Boschini et al., 2007:596-597). These theories cannot sufficiently explain why some countries 
like Norway and Botswana have been able to avoid their ‘inevitable’ destiny, and make their resources 
a blessing (Polterovich et al., 2010:1). For that reason some scholars suggest another explanation to this 
paradox: they stress that the explanation is to be found in the institutional differences (Mehlum et al. 
2006; Ross 2001; Murshed 2003; Gylfason & Zoega 2001 among others).  
 
Therefore, in this project, the classic approaches dooming resource abundant countries will be 
challenged by a focus on institutions. We will test the robustness of this hypothesis by applying the 
theoretical framework of the institutional approach to the case of Angola. With huge resource 
endowments and an often criticised economic, social and political trajectory (Trading Economics, 
Consumer Sentiment; Hammond, 2011:356), Angola has often been used as a classical example of the 
resource curse (Hammond, 2011:348). Furthermore, it relies heavily on oil as an export commodity 
(World Bank, 2011: Oil Rents). However, while most scholars agree that the indicators of a resource 
cursed country are apparent in Angola, many disagree on why it has come so far (Niño & Le Billon 
2014; Hammond 2011; Hodges 2004). Where the vast majority of traditional explanations seem to 
point to the inevitability of resource endowments leading to bad economic performances, the 
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institutional approach leaves room for manoeuvrability, thus the possibility that bad economic 
performance can be turned into a good over time (Rosser, 2006:14). We find it both important and 
intriguing to test this more optimistic approach on a case examining many of the indicators of a 
resource cursed country, such as Angola does. 
 
That being said, the aim of this paper is to contribute to the resource curse debate from an institutional 
perspective, in which we find Angola suitable for an examination of the link between resource 
abundance and economic performance, when taking institutions into account. This leads us to the 
following problem formulation: 
 
1.1 Problem formulation 
 
To what extent and how does the quality of institutions determine whether natural resource abundance 
has a negative or positive impact on economic performance in the case of Angola? 
 
1.2 Working questions 
We will pursue to answer the above problem formulation through the following working questions. The 
first two questions will be answered in the theory chapter and methodology chapter, respectively, and 
question 3-5 will be answered during the analysis.  
1. According to institutional theories, what is the definition of institutions and institutional 
quality?  
2. How can we answer our problem formulation, and how can we operationalize the institutional 
theories?  
3. How has the economic performance of Angola developed from 2006 to 2013?  
4. What is the quality of institution of Angola, based on quantitative and qualitative data?  
5. How is the oil sector organized in Angola, and what impact does the national oil company 
Sonangol have on institutional quality?  
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1.3 Elaboration of the problem formulation 
In this section, we will briefly elaborate on our problem formulation, in order to define what we mean 
by the different terms and concepts set forth herein.  
 
First of all, it is an important task to identify the proper definitions of both institutions and the quality 
of institutions for this project. We have adopted the definition of institutions as the “rules of the game”, 
shaped by both informal and formal rules from Douglas North (2005, 2011), which will be elaborated 
further in the theory chapter (Page 21). When referring to ‘quality of institutions’ it is in accordance 
with the definition from the theoretical framework of Mehlum et al. (2006ab): high quality institutions 
are equal to producer-friendly institutions, and low quality institution is equal to grabber-friendly 
institutions. This will be further clarified in the theory chapter (Page 18) and operationalized in the 
methodological chapter (Page 41).  
 
Second, when referring to natural resource abundance in the case of Angola we are only referring to the 
oil sector. This is the strongest economical branch within the country and driving force in the Angolan 
economy.  
 
Thirdly, we would like to clarify what we mean by economic performance. In this project, we have 
chosen to look at economic performance based on the GDP measures and the structural transformation 
within Angola. In this project, we have worked with structural transformation as the reallocation of 
economic activity in order to develop new, more productive economic activities, and movement of 
resources to newer sectors (African Economic Outlook, 2013 Taking Stock on Africa’s Structural 
Transformation). When briefly examining the structural transformation, we will mainly be looking at 
employment structures and the agricultural sector, which offers great potential for development to the 
industrial sector (ibid).  
 
Fourth, our theoretical chapter will furthermore present the institutional approach, which will constitute 
our theoretical framework throughout this project. This framework will be based on the writings by the 
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New Institutional Economics, while drawing specifically on the merits by Mehlum et al. (2006ab), 
Douglass North (2005, 2011) and Ronald Coase (1960). We intend to test the robustness of the 
hypothesis set forth by the institutional approach, which holds that there is a link between resource 
abundance and economic performance, when institutions are considered. However, we will test this 
hypothesis while at the same time be open-minded to the fact, that we may or may not discover a direct 
link concerning this specific causality.  
 
Finally, we find it important to set a certain time frame concerning the case of Angola. It could be 
argued, that it is not possible to investigate an institutional setting within a country during a civil war, 
and Angola has been affected by civil war up until 2002. Furthermore, according to the Heritage 
Foundation, grading of Angola has been temporarily suspended from 2001 to 2005, and much of its 
notable progress over the history has occurred since 2006 (Miller et al., 2014:97). Thus, we have set the 
time frame from 2006 – up until 2013, in order to analyse the institutional quality of Angola in the best 
possible way.  
 
1.4 Background knowledge on Angola  
In this subsection, we would like to provide a brief introduction to the case of Angola. Theoretically, 
Angola has the potential to benefit from its resources: it is endowed with an abundance of natural 
resources, particularly oil and minerals, and it is one of Africa's biggest oil and diamond producers 
(Hammond, 2011:354). The country has an extensive economic growth, which almost exclusively 
origin from the oil sector through a combination of increased production and record prices for oil 
(Hammond, 2011:358; Trading Economics, 2014 Angola–BNP–Vækst–2014), whereas oil rents 
contributed on average to 47% of GDP in the years 2008 – 2012 (World Bank, 2011 Oil Rents (% of 
GDP)). However, the Angolan population has received virtually no benefits from this (Shaxson, 
2009:91). Instead, scholars argue, that a narrow elite skim the cream (Roque, 2011:2; Shaxson, 
2009:91). Hodges (2004) puts it eerily bluntly when stating that:  
“If these resources were managed properly, Angola's economy would be among the most dynamic 
in the developing world. Its people would be among the best fed, best educated and healthiest on the 
African continent. The reality is quite the opposite” (Hodges, 2004:1). 
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This has to be understood in the context of Angola’s bloody history: In 1961, a violent struggle against 
Angola’s colonial superiors began (Hammond, 2011:357; Shaxson, 2009:52), and Angola gained 
independence in 1975 (Hammond, 2011:356), however, the establishment of independence did not lead 
to peace. Along with the struggles three rebel factions arose, and after the independence the fights 
amongst these groups started a civil war that lasted until 2002 (Shaxson, 2009:52; De Oliveria, 
2007:597; Hammond, 2011:357). Since the end of the civil war, the MPLA party and its leader Jose 
Eduardo Dos Santos gained rule of the country. The party is virtually uncontested politically, and holds 
a great share of the electorate (Roque, 2013:1), although Angola has been ranked as one of the 
countries with extraordinary and severe challenges regarding corruption (Shaxson, 2009:71; Hammond, 
2011:360). Some even talk of Angola having a parallel government: a formal and an informal shadow 
government (Roque, 2011, Shaxson, 2009:70). The system of parallel governing has maintained a 
stable political order since the end of the civil war, as well as spurring economic growth, through 
authoritarian governing practices (Hammond, 2011:360; Roque, 2011:1). 
 
A crucial player in the extractive branch is the national oil company Sonangol, established in 1976 to 
manage the oil industry and secure a maximum amount of rents for the Angolan state (Heller, 
2012:836). In the Angolan oil sector, mainly the multinational actors perform the greatest amount of the 
work, especially international oil companies from the U.S. and Europe are the big players in terms of 
exploration, extraction and production of oil in the country. This is related to the fact that most of oil is 
being extracted offshore and technological assets are required to produce efficiently (U.S. Energy 
Information Administration, 2014 Angola Background). 
 
The anatomy of the Angolan economy, before the finding and effective extraction of oil, should be 
contrasted in order to show the destructive effect on other sectors. In 1960, coffee was the main product 
for export in Angola, manufacturing played a significant role and unprocessed agricultural goods 
constituted 56% of exports (Hammond, 2011:356). Today, coffee exports is a mere 0,0006% of total 
export revenue (Niño & Le Billon, 2014:89; Shaxson, 2009:64). The collapse of the non-oil sectors has 
ensured a high export concentration of oil. Combined with the fact that the Angolan exports reach very 
few markets indicates, that Angolan (non-oil-related) firms face severe problems in their ability to 
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participate in the global economy (World Bank, 2013:8). The combination of vulnerability to 
fluctuating oil prices, the lack of developed non-oil sectors, authoritarian rule and widespread poverty 
has convinced most scholars that Angola is a resource cursed country (Shaxson 2009; Hammond 2011). 
 
1.5 Structure of the report 
In this section, we would like to present the structure of this report and explain our intention with each 
section accordingly.  
1. Introduction: The introduction should now have provided the reader with a presentation to 
this project. This includes a presentation of the problem formulation, working questions, the 
elaboration of the problem formulation and finally a brief introduction to the case of Angola.  
 
2. Literature review: In order to embroil the reader in the, at times, murky waters of the resource 
abundance and resource curse literature, a brief outline of the most important debates in this 
field will be presented.  
 
3. Institutional approach: From the literature review, we will introduce the theoretical approach 
of the project, beginning with a general introduction to the field of New Institutional 
Economics. Next, we will introduce the theoretical merits by Mehlum et al. (2006ab), Douglass 
North (2005, 2011) and Ronald Coase (1960), while also presenting some additional theoretical 
views mainly based on writings by Acemoglu et al. (2002, 2004) and Robinson et al. (2006).  
 
4. Methodology: Next, within the methodology section, we wish to introduce our 
methodological considerations on how we intent to answer our problem formulation. This 
section will also serve to clarify our quantitative and qualitative data and the operationalization 
of the institutional approach. 
 
5.   Analysis: Having first presented the economic performance of Angola, we have chosen to 
divide our analysis into three parts.  
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1.  The first part of the analysis will serve to analyse the quality of institutions based on 
quantitative data. In determining the quality of institutions we will draw upon four 
analytical indicators, in which we have derived from our theoretical framework and 
operationalized. The indicators are: the rule of law, bureaucratic quality, corruption in 
government and the business environment.   
2. In the second part of the analysis we will put the findings from part one into a broader 
perspective, as we seek to analyse the quality of institutions in Angola based on qualitative 
data. As in part one of the analysis we will analyse part two accordingly to the four 
analytical indicators. These two parts combined will serve to clarify the quality of 
institutions within Angola.  
3. In the third and final part we seek to include an analytical discussion in order to fully 
answer our problem formulation. In this sense we will discuss the findings of the economic 
performance of Angola and the quality of its institutions in determining: to what extent and 
how the quality of institutions determine whether natural resource abundance has a negative 
or positive impact on economic performance in the case of Angola.  
 
6. Conclusion: This section will present our final conclusion to our problem formulation.  
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2.0 Literature Review 
This leads us to the following literature review on the resource curse debate. To perceive natural 
resources as a curse rather than a blessing could seem rather paradoxical. Nevertheless, this is the 
argument set forth by many scholars in relation to Sub-Saharan Africa (Carmignani & Chowdhury 
2010; Lundgren et al. 2013 among others). It has been necessary to boil these down to a few of what 
we deem the most relevant, in order to show the field in which the institutional approach is situated. 
Drawing upon Kaplinsky et al. (2012), we have summed up the different debates into three main 
subchapters: terms of trade and the volatility of commodity prices, the Dutch Disease and the enclave 
nature of resource activities.   
 
2.1 Terms of trade and the volatility of commodity prices 
Prebisch and Singer (1950) are two very prominent scholars in the field of resource abundance, who 
have contributed with one of the earliest debates on economic performance and resource abundance. 
According to Rosser (2006) these scholars base their argument on the assumption, that countries rich 
on natural resources will experience declining terms of trade and commodity prices falling relative to 
manufacturing (Rosser, 2006:13). Furthermore, the long-term trends will affect commodity- and 
manufacturing prices by labour markets and high- and low-income economies.  
 
According to Kaplinsky et al. (2012) Prebisch and Singer’s results shows that prices on low-income 
countries’ commodity tend to stay low, because of a surplus of labour, and lack of demand for higher 
wages from trade unions, unlike in the high income countries (Kaplinsky et al., 2012:4). This means 
that they can export their commodities very cheaply while importing is expensive (Kaplinsky et al., 
2012:5). Singer argues, according to Rosser (2006), that because of its relative difficult-to-copy 
technology, high barriers protect manufacturing. However, this is not the case for commodities, and 
therefore the barriers to entry in this sector is low, and the income of producers is not protected like in 
the manufacturing sector, which means high competitive pressures. Because of this nature of the global 
commodity market, as well as the structure of the global economy, countries, relying on natural 
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resource exports, are put at a serious disadvantage (Rosser, 2006:7). Thus, the declining terms of trade 
makes sure that countries with abundance in natural resource are constrained in their prospects for 
economic growth and development (Rosser, 2006:13). 
 
2.2 The Dutch Disease 
Another argument central to the resource curse advocates is the Dutch Disease. Within this area, Sachs 
and Warner (1995) are often referred to as central scholars. According to Kaplinsky et al. (2012) Sachs 
and Warner find a negative correlation between resource abundance and GDP. They observed a 
significant reduction in GDP growth from 1970-1990, alongside with a doubling of primary products 
share in total export (Kaplinsky et al., 2012:6-7).  
 
The Dutch Disease, according to Rosser (2006) therefore derives from the perception that a resource 
boom leads to a rapid increase in exchange rates, thus a stronger currency, which is damaging to the 
manufacturing and other tradable sectors (Rosser, 2006:14). This negative effect on manufacturing is 
the result of the unequal competition between non-traded goods and the producers of the traded goods. 
Traded goods become, according to Kaplinsky et al. (2012), more expensive while imports become 
cheaper, which makes it very hard for the producers of the traded goods to compete in export and 
imports. It simply becomes cheaper to import rather than produce the goods at home, and prices on 
exported goods rises (Kaplinsky et al., 2012:7). Thus, Kaplinsky et al. (2012) further argues, that the 
findings by Sachs and Warner connected resource abundance with decline in the manufacturing and 
service sectors (Kaplinsky et al., 2012:7). Thus, according to Di John (2011) deindustrialization 
becomes the inevitable outcome of an oil boom, and resource abundance a curse rather than a blessing 
(Di John, 2011:169).  
 
2.3 The enclave nature of resource activities 
The enclave nature of resource activities is another popular explanation of the resource curse, and the 
consequence of large resource endowments (Kaplinsky et al., 2012:3). Kaplinsky et al. (2012) point out 
how puzzling the coexistence of a foreign economy next to the domestic sectors is, in terms of a proper 
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economic analysis, and refer to the article “The Distribution of Gains Between Investing and 
Borrowing Countries” (1950) by Hans Singer (Kaplinsky et al., 2012:9).  
 
However, Singer emphasizes that it is necessary to be careful with conclusions about the economic 
performance of an underdeveloped country. This is due to a pattern in underdeveloped countries with 
high productivity in the export sectors, while the sector with production for the domestic demand 
remains low on productivity levels (Singer, 1950:474). Although the initial assumption is to conclude 
towards beneficial effects of sectors related to foreign trade regarding the economic capacity and 
knowledge, Singer warns of quick interpretations (Singer, 1950:474). Singer draws the picture of an 
enclave of an economic sector in an underdeveloped country, which, due to lacking linkages, has not 
become a part of the local economy. It can actually easily even hamper their own technological 
development of the country – an aspect that is crucial for industrialization of a country (Singer, 
1950:477).  
 
Kaplinsky et al. (2012) further argues that the existence of an export sector leads to the fact that 
emerging industrial linkages would be directly connected to this economic branch, leaving the other 
domestically orientated sectors without development in terms of linkages (Kaplinsky et al., 2012:10). 
Furthermore, the concentration of infrastructural development, related to an easier export of the 
particular commodity, leaves other sectors, within an underdeveloped country, without incentives to 
extend its roads, ports or energy and water supply (Kaplinsky et al., 2012:10). These aspects lead to the 
assumption within a pessimist assumption that resource abundance has a negative effect on economic 
performance, and serve to curse a country.  
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3.0 Institutional Approach 
While these more traditional explanations of the resource curse, put forward in the literature review, 
mainly focus on the average effect of resource wealth on a number of states, more recent literature 
focus on why outcomes vary in the same number of states (Ross, 2014:3). Furthermore, where the 
initial studies of resource abundance suggested that there was a strictly economic connection between 
resource abundance and economic growth, newer studies have emphasised that institutional differences 
matter. The result has been that some economists have started to incorporate ideas from political 
science into their work on the resource curse, mainly deriving from Neoclassical Economics or New 
Institutional Economics (Rosser, 2006:14). 
 
Recent studies claim to find empirical evidence for this institutional approach, as well as claiming that 
by no means is the resource curse cast in stone. By taking foothold in New Institutional Economics, 
scholars such as Mehlum et al. (2006ab) and North (2005, 2011) provide a more 'optimistic' view on 
resource abundance.   
 
In the following chapter, we will review the relevant institutional theories surrounding our case in 
Angola. This theoretical review will take a starting point in New Institutional Economics, which serves 
as our overall understanding of the institutional theories. Next, the chapter will focus on the specific 
work by Mehlum et al. (2006ab) Douglass North (2005, 2011) and briefly touch upon Ronald H. Coase 
(1960). Combined, these theories will serve as an operationalization as our overall theoretical 
understanding of institutions and institutional quality. Furthermore, we will introduce complementary 
theoretical views and a critical assessment of the institutional approach, mainly based on Mehlum et al. 
(2006ab).  
 
3.1 New Institutional Economics 
Scholars of New Institutional Economics (NIE) study institutions, and how these interact with 
organisational arrangements such as markets, firms, contractual agreements and various behavioural 
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traits underlying the arrangements (Menard & Shirley, 2005:1). 
 
The approach of NIE define institutions as: 
 
“The written and unwritten rules, norms and constraints that humans device to reduce uncertainty 
and control their environment. These include (i) written rules and agreements that govern 
contractual relations and corporate governance, (ii) constitutions, laws and rules that govern 
politics, government, finance, and society more broadly, and (iii) unwritten codes of conduct, norms 
of behaviour, and beliefs” (Menard & Shirley, 2005:1). 
 
Economic change cannot be understood without these institutions, and institutions cannot be 
understood without analysing human incentives and intentions (Menard & Shirley, 2005:2). NIE seeks 
to explain why institutions emerge, why they perform in a certain way and which effect the institutional 
arrangement has on certain individuals. This is in contrast with the older neoclassical paradigm, which 
was only marginally interested in institutions, but focused more on the efficiency of the outcomes of 
markets (Spruyt, 2013:117). In general, NIE differs from the old neoclassical paradigm in one 
important way: by assuming that actors are rational, it realizes that individuals make decisions under 
uncertainty (Spruyt, 2013:118). In this sense both approaches are methodologically individualist, but 
whereas the older neoclassical paradigm operates on the premise that individuals are the primary unit 
of analysis, the NIE approach seeks to make institutions the centrepiece of its analysis (Spruyt, 
2013:118-119). 
 
While the older neoclassical economy assumes that individuals have perfect information and always act 
rationally, the NIE approach stresses the limited mental capacity of individuals and lack of complete 
information. Because of this uncertainty, they incur transaction costs1 in order to achieve this 
information (Menard & Shirley, 2005:1). In order to limit these risks and transactions costs, humans 
create institutions, which can play out either as formal or informal institutions. Formal institutions are 
                                                                    
1 
 Please see page 24 for a thorough explanation of transaction costs. 
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derived from writing and enforcing constitutions, laws, contracts and regulations2, whereas informal 
institutions consist of the structuring and indoctrinating norms of conduct, beliefs and habits of thought 
and behaviour (Menard & Shirley, 2005:2). 
 
Institutions as the centrepiece of analysis have also been addressed by scholars such as Mehlum et al. 
(2006ab) and North (2005, 2011), as they claim institutions matter in the context of resource 
abundance. The NIE approach offers a possibility to combine concepts of economics and political 
science, as well as focusing on the agent, instead of only focussing on the structural implications. In 
this context, two things should be noted: the first being, that even though we place Mehlum et al. 
(2006ab) and North in the category of NIE, only North is referred to as an NIE scholar (Menard & 
Shirley, 2005). We have placed Mehlum et al. (2006ab) in this category since they base their 
assumptions on key elements of NIE. In other words, even though these scholars have not explicitly 
stated that they adhere to the NIE approach, we believe that the particular articles, that we employ, 
belong to the category. 
  
We now intend to turn our focus to the concrete theoretical assumptions taking root in the work of 
Mehlum et al. (2006ab). 
 
3.2 Halvor Mehlum, Karl Moene and Ragnar Torvik 
Mehlum et al. find it quite puzzling that not all resource rich countries are cursed, as growth winners 
such as Botswana, Norway, Canada and Australia have become prosperous because of, rather than 
despite of their natural resources (Mehlum et al., 2006b:1117). This implies that natural resources are 
not a curse per se. According to Mehlum et al. (2006ab) the economic consequences of finding natural 
resources are therefore determined by the quality of institutions. The resource curse is in this sense less 
deterministic, as it is possible to escape the resource curse by rearranging the allocation of resource 
rents. Thus, the poor economic performance depends on the ability of institutions to either channel the 
                                                                    
2  See point (i) and (ii) from the above quote. 
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rents into the productive economy, or just by letting the rents be captured by the elite for personal 
enrichment (Mehlum et al., 2006b:1119). 
 
This institutional approach contrasts the rent-seeking hypothesis that Sachs and Warner (1995) 
considered, but ended up dismissing in favour of the Dutch Disease. Sachs and Warner did try to 
explore the connection between economic growth and institutional quality, but end up arguing: “[…] 
there is only weak evidence that primary resources is associated with poorer bureaucratic quality” 
(Sachs & Warner 1995:19). However, Mehlum et al. (2006ab) argue that the role of institutions cannot 
be disregarded only based on the lack of empirical evidence of institutional decay caused by resource 
abundance, as: 
 
“Institutions may be decisive for how natural resources affect economic growth even if resource 
abundance has no effect on institutions. We claim that natural resources put the institutional 
arrangements to a test, so that the resource curse only appears in countries with inferior 
institutions,” (Mehlum et al, 2006a:3). 
 
In this sense Mehlum et al. criticizes Sachs and Warner for not considering the hypothesis that bad 
institutions can explain the resource curse, and that good institutions can help eliminate the resource 
curse, and even make natural resources a blessing. This institutional approach must therefore be seen in 
the light of trying to make the Dutch Disease story less acceptable as the main explanation for the 
resource curse, as has often been the case in the resource curse literature (Mehlum et al., 2006a: 12; 
Mehlum et al., 2006b:1120). 
 
The main theoretical focus of hypothesis by Mehlum et al., is the tension between production and 
certain ways of rent seeking, thus the allocation of entrepreneurs between productive and unproductive 
rent extraction (grabbing). As already mentioned, resource rents may be channelled into the productive 
economy or be captured, ‘grabbed’, by the elite. As grabbing obviously harms economic development, 
it depends on the quality of the institutions that these resources may or may not induce entrepreneurs to 
specialise in grabbing (Mehlum et al., 2006a:4). The scholars provide empirical evidence for this 
20 
 
hypothesis, using the dataset of Sachs and Warner (1997), thus combined they introduce the rent-
seeking model: 
 
3.3 The rent-seeking model 
For Mehlum et al. (2006ab) the most important institutions are those governing the profitability of 
productive enterprise in the private sector. As the private sector is not further defined by these scholars 
this project has chosen the definition of the business environment. In this sense, the private sector is the 
sector, which is run by private enterprises and entrepreneurs. The model by Mehlum et al. (2006ab) 
therefore stresses the importance of institutions of private sector efficiency such as the rule of law, 
bureaucratic efficiency, low corruption and the risk of expropriation and repudiation of contracts 
(Mehlum et al., 2006b:1122).  
 
In the rent-seeking, model entrepreneurs choose between rent-seeking and productive activities. The 
relative profitability of productive activities depends on the quality of institutions. High institutional 
quality (producer-friendly institutions) leads to an equilibrium where all entrepreneurs are producers, 
and low institutional quality (grabber-friendly institutions) leads to one where certain amounts of 
entrepreneurs are rent-seekers. A grabber-friendly institution has characteristics such as dysfunctional 
democracies, which invites political rent appropriation; low transparency, corruption, weak rule of law, 
weak protection of property- and citizens’ rights (Mehlum et al., 2006b:1121). With this type of 
institutions rent-seeking pays off outside the productive economy, as there is a disadvantage from being 
a producer in the competition for natural resource rents, thus production and rent-seeking becomes 
competing activities (Mehlum et al., 2006b:1121). Consequently, the model illustrates how grabber-
friendly institutions push aggregate income down, when natural resources are discovered in a given 
country. This also explains how natural resources become a curse rather than a blessing (Mehlum et al., 
2006b:1128). This effect is by the scholars denoted as the displacement effect, as it reduces national 
income because entrepreneurs move from production to grabbing.  
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In contrast, we see an immediate income effect in producer-friendly institutions, as higher resource rent 
leads to an increase in national income (Mehlum et al., 2006a:9). Producer-friendly institutions have 
characteristics that all imply effective production activities, such as high bureaucratic quality, low 
corruption in government and rule of law (Mehlum et al., 2006b:1122). With producer-friendly 
institutions the national income increases with the discovery of natural resources, thus making it 
possible for a resource abundant country to escape the resource curse, and even make it a blessing 
(Mehlum et al., 2006b:1128). Hence, with a producer-friendly institution it becomes difficult to be an 
effective rent-seeker, unless you are a producer. These institutions provide an advantage regarding 
subsidies, public support etc. for producers, in which production and rent seeking becomes 
complementary, instead of competing, activities. 
 
The rent-seeking model set forth by Mehlum et al. (2006ab) has been widely discussed, and even 
empirically tested as being highly relevant for economic development in poor countries (Kolstad, 
2007). However, as rent-seeking models tend to focus only at the private sector institutions, and we 
wish to apply a broader institutional perspective, we have chosen to draw upon the work by Douglass 
North (2005, 2011) and Ronald Coase (1960). At the same time, Mehlum et al. does specify that in 
focusing on the decisive role of institutions for economic development the scholars are, among others, 
inspired by North and Thomas (1973) (Mehlum et al., 2006a:2).  
 
3.4 Douglass North 
The approach of North in grasping institutional and economic change, as well as economic 
performance has, in the vein of NIE, the entrepreneur as the centrepiece. Where institutions make up 
the 'rules of the game', as both formal written and unwritten rules, organisations are the players (North, 
2011:4). Organizations are made up of groups of individuals seeking the same objectives, as for 
instance economic organizations such as firms and trade unions (North, 2011:5). Organizations, and 
hereby individuals, are seeking profit maximizing in the short run, and, because of scarcity and 
competition, are ultimately fighting for survival. This scarcity and fight for survival is what induces 
entrepreneurs to invest in skills and knowledge to the benefit of their organization (North, 2005:22). 
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From Mehlum et al. we saw that the entrepreneurs would choose between rent-seeking or productive 
activities according to what is the most profitable (Mehlum et al. 2006ab). This is in line with North 
(2005), who elaborates further that the main goal of the entrepreneur is maximizing profit or payoff, 
and that this is the main driver for investment and knowledge accumulation, eventually leading to 
institutional change (North, 2005:23).  
 
North further emphasises that institutional change is incremental, and path dependent (North, 2005:24). 
According to North, it is important to note, that change does not necessarily equate to economic growth 
or progress, but that the direction of change is a result of whether income redistribution or productive 
activity is perceived to lead to the highest amount of payoff.  This distinction resemble to that of 
Mehlum et al. (2006ab) with the distinction of producer-friendly and grabber-friendly institutions. In 
North's account, every economy has a different set of incentives for both activities, and the weight 
between the redistributive and productive incentives are crucial factors for the performance of the 
economy as such (North, 2005:23). The institutional framework will shape the trajectory of a given 
economy, which can be viewed through the particular investments in skills and knowledge its leading 
organizations make. 
 
In other words if the highest rate of return in a given economy comes from a redistributive activity such 
as piracy, then one can reasonably expect that the organizations will invest in the skills and knowledge 
needed to make them better pirates. However, if there are higher returns in productivity increasing 
activities3, it is similarly reasonable to expect organizations to invest in skills and knowledge that 
increases overall productivity (ibid.). Whether an economy is driven by either redistributive or 
productive activities, will have an effect on the level of investment into fundamental economic 
foundations, such as formal education, schooling, the dissemination of knowledge, and research (ibid.). 
Where Mehlum et al. (2006ab) make the distinction between grabber-friendly and producer-friendly 
                                                                    
3
 North gives the example of a pirate and a chemical manufacturer. The economy, where piracy (income redistribution) is 
the most preferred (profitable) activity, a demand will rise of naval warfare technology, which will shape the trajectory of 
this given economy. However, in another economy, e.g. in the early 20th century USA, successful chemical manufacturers 
(productivity increasing) gave rise to a demand for both applied and pure chemical research, as well as the study of markets, 
efficiency and transaction costs (North, 2011:77). 
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institutions to show that institutions, are decisive in whether or not resources may be harmful to an 
economy, North illustrates how the shaping and emergence of these institutions have long term 
consequences for an economy.  
 
In essence this boils down to the argument that if an economy has a history of, to use the term of 
Mehlum et al. (2006ab): grabber-friendly institutions, then changing this is going to be incremental. 
Structures have a constraining effect on actors, or entrepreneurs, but they can and eventually will be 
changed, through the profit and opportunity seeking of the entrepreneur (North, 2011). The focus of 
Mehlum et al. (2006ab) follows the logic of North, in that it is the quality of institutions that induces 
the entrepreneur to either specialise in grabbing or in productive activities (Mehlum et al., 2006a:4).  
 
What lacks from this explanation is the interplay between the agency of the entrepreneur and the 
constraints of institutional structures. Here, North points to the belief systems of a society: The 
dominant belief system in a society, held by leading political and economic entrepreneurs, leads them 
to create certain structures of institutions, or rules, both formal and informal, determining the economic 
and political performance of a country. These structures make up a so-called institutional matrix that 
imposes constraints on modification or introduction of new institutions in order to improve the position 
of the entrepreneur. This is also the reason why economies perform differently; because of the way, 
individuals perceive payoff. This perception is shaped by the way the human mind interprets 
information it receives, stemming from the genetic evolution of the mind, the cultural heritage of the 
individual, local everyday problems, that must be confronted and solved, and non-local learning 
(North, 2005:29). 
 
Because of this, individuals, from different backgrounds, will interpret the same evidence differently, 
and this may lead them to make different choices. Following this, difficulties of economic change can 
often be subscribed to the belief system that has evolved as a result of cumulative past experiences of a 
society, which may not have equipped its members to confront and solve new problems (ibid.). 
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3.5 Ronald Coase 
The theoretical assumptions about institutions, developed by North (2011, 2005) and Mehlum et al. 
(2006ab,) are all eventually based on the Coase Theorem, within the framework of New Institutional 
Economics. Nobel Prize laureate Ronald H. Coase first developed this in the paper “The Problem of 
Social Cost” (1960). The economist coined the theory of NIE already in 1937 with his paper “The 
Nature of the Firm”. We intend to supplement the findings of our institutional approach with the 
writings of Ronald Coase concerning his focus on property rights.  
 
Emerged from the analysis about the logic of relations among firms, according to the Coase Theorem, 
transaction cost, which is “[…] the costs of running the economic system” (Arrow, 1969:48), play a 
significant role in market dynamics. Perfect information about other actors’ property rights is necessary 
in order to avoid negative externalities and achieve the most efficient and beneficial agreement. In this 
sense, property rights can be defined as “[…] sanctioned behavioural relations among men, which 
arise from the existence of things and pertain to their use” (Furubotn & Pejovich, 1972:1139, emphasis 
in original). Property rights “affect the allocation of resources in specific and predictable ways” 
(Furubotn & Pejovich, 1972:1139, emphasis in original), and they have to be well-defined in order to 
keep transaction costs low. Nevertheless, transaction costs will always emerge due to the imperfection 
of human beings, and these imperfections, like asymmetric information and knowledge, lead to 
inefficiency of the economic system (Furubotn & Richter, 2005:47-48), but their extent can be 
influenced. According to the Coase Theorem, by the introduction of well-defined property rights, 
transaction costs can be sufficiently overcome for a significant increase of efficiency.  
 
As North points out, institutions are the formal and informal rules of the game (North, 2005:22), and 
these institutions have to be strong in order to define property rights accurately, which leads to the most 
efficient economic allocation (Coase, 1960:6). The efficiency determines the actions and incentives of 
the actors in the game. If property rights are ill-defined different actors in economic interactions will 
interfere with the others’ actions respectively, which leads to harm or negative externalities. By having 
well-defined property rights actors will gain success through bargaining each other’s rights (Coase, 
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1960:2). This is an important part of the theoretical approach of both North (2005, 2011) and Mehlum 
et al. (2006ab), in the sense that incentives are what leads entrepreneurs to engage in either 
redistributive or productive activities. Moreover, since entrepreneurs are the main drivers of investment 
in skills and knowledge in a society, consequently when property rights are ill-defined entrepreneurs 
will shift away from productive activities towards rent-seeking (Mehlum et al., 2006ab). 
 
In a nutshell it is initially crucial to have stable institutions to keep transaction costs low; otherwise, the 
adjustment of property rights becomes far too expensive and hampers beneficial incentives for 
economic allocation. This is what contribute in general to the focus on institutions governing the 
profitability of productive enterprises in the private sector since this is the main area where the 
entrepreneurs of a given society decide whether it pays off to engage in activities inside or outside the 
productive part of the economy4. 
 
3.6 Sub conclusion 
Based on this theoretical framework we can derive certain perceptions of institutions and institutional 
quality. We derive our definition on institutions from North (2011), who infer that institutions are ‘the 
rule of    the game’. Furthermore, North distinguishes between the informal rules, such as behaviour 
and beliefs, and formal rules of the game, such as constitutions and laws, which in different ways 
constraints and    thus directs human actions (North, 2011:3, 36-47). As stated by the references to 
North (2005, 2011), Coase (1960) and Mehlum et al. (2006ab) the quality of institutions have a great 
significance, since they have an impact on the economic performance. When referring to the resource 
curse we will apply the definition by Mehlum et al.: “When institutions are bad resource abundance is a 
growth curse, when institutions are good resource abundance is a blessing” (Mehlum et al., 
2006b:1127).  
 
From Mehlum et al. (2006ab) we can derive that institutions of high quality are defined as producer-
                                                                    
4 E.g. Whether an actor can attain most profit from being a warlord outside of the productive economy, or from taking part 
in the productive economy, as for instance an oil contractor in a resource abundant country (Mehlum, 2006b:1121).  
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friendly institutions, whereas institutions of low quality are defined as grabber-friendly institutions. In 
determining the level of institutional quality we intend to look at the same areas set forth by Mehlum et 
al.: rule of law, bureaucratic quality, corruption in government, risk of expropriation, and risk of 
government repudiation of contracts (Mehlum et al., 2006b:1127). We have chosen to apply these four 
areas as analytical indicators in the analysis, which will be operationalized in methodology (page 41). 
In doing so, we will define these as:  
 
1. Rule of law 
In this project, we intend to define the rule of law as the formal rules of the game, such as “...the quality 
of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime 
and violence.” (World Bank Group, 2014 Rule of Law). Furthermore, as property rights are a crucial 
element of rule of law, we intend to define this in accordance with NIE: property rights can be defined 
as “[…] sanctioned behavioural relations among men, which arise from the existence of things and 
pertain to their use” (Furubotn & Pejovich, 1972:1139, emphasis in original). 
2. Bureaucratic quality 
The indicator of bureaucratic quality is an important one as it is closely linked to the rule of law. 
Turning to the World Bank Governance Indicators, we will define this as:  
 
“[…] the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. This includes (a) 
the process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced; (b) the capacity of the 
government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies; and (c) the respect of citizens 
and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them.” 
(Kaufmann et al., 2010:4).  
3. Corruption in government 
In this project, we will work with an overall definition of corruption based on the perception, that 
corruption is the misuse of entrusted power for private gain. This applies in both the private and public 
sector, which means that we will be drawing upon data on corruption in both businesses and 
government.  
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4. Business environment 
The last two areas set forth by Mehlum et al. (2006ab): risk of expropriation and risk of government 
repudiation of contracts will be combined under the analytical indicator: business environment. This 
implies that we seek to analyse whether or not the business environment in Angola have had an impact 
on its economic performance. The business environment will be limited to a discussion of the ease of 
starting a business, the enforcement of contracts, and protection of minority investor.  
 
These indicators will be operationalized on page 41in the section of methodology and presented as part 
of our analytical strategy.  
 
 
3.7 Complimentary theoretical views 
In this chapter, we seek to bring in some complimentary views on the institutional framework, which 
we have presented. Having many reservations regarding their own theory, Mehlum et al. does specify 
that there may also be additional reasons for why institutions are key to understanding the resource 
curse, than illustrated by their own model (Mehlum et al., 2006b:1126). Referring to the model 
developed by Robinson et al. (2006), Mehlum et al. point to an additional factor such as politics, which 
may be able to explain the link between institutions and the resource curse. According to Robinson et 
al. (2006) the theoretical work on the resource curse has not developed explicitly political models, 
which is a gap in the literature.  
 
Theorists such as Mehlum et al. (2006ab) tend to ignore politicians and political incentives and 
perceive the state as simply an aggregator of pressure from interests groups. In reality, and particularly 
in developing countries, politicians seems to have quite a large amount of autonomy from interest 
groups (Robinson et al., 2006:448). This leaves room for a discussion on which institutions matter, 
when dealing with economic performance, as this project is. Because as the rent-seeking model by 
Mehlum et al. (2006ab) seem to stress the importance of institutions of private sector efficiency such as 
the rule of law, bureaucratic efficiency, the risk of expropriation and repudiation of contracts, the 
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patronage model of Robinson et al (2006) emphasizes institutions of public sector accountability 
(Kolstad, 2007:2).  
 
This political factor emphasised by Robinson et al. (2006) is an addition to NIE, which is also stressed 
by Acemoglu et al. (2002). In the paper ”Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the making 
of the Modern World Income Distribution5”. Acemoglu et al. (2002) seek to explain why those 
countries that were rich before being colonized by European powers in the 1500's, are now relatively 
poor. In doing so, the scholars emphasise that societies, with a social organisation that can encourage 
investment, tend to be the ones that prosper the most (Acemoglu et al., 2002:1262). In this context, a 
good social organisation is defined as a cluster of political, economic and social institutions ensuring, 
that as large a part of society as possible enjoys effective property rights (Acemoglu et al., 2002:1262).  
 
These so-called clusters are referred to as institutions of private property and extractive institutions. 
Akin to what Mehlum et al. (2006ab) define as grabber-friendly institutions, extractive institutions are 
institutions:”[...]where the majority of a population faces a high risk of expropriation and hold up by 
the government, the ruling elite, or other agents” (Acemoglu et al., 2002:1262). It is crucial for an 
economy that those with productive opportunities can expect to receive a return for their investments, 
as well as being encouraged to undertake such investments in the first place. Furthermore, a society in 
which only a minor fraction of the population holds the wealth and political power is not necessarily 
conducive to investments, as many of the actors, with entrepreneurial human capital and investment 
opportunities, may very well be those without effective property rights protection (Acemoglu et al., 
2002:1263). The fact that only a narrow elite benefits from state rules and regulations offers scant 
prospects for long-term growth, whereas broad based political power is vital in the long run (ibid.).  
 
The scholars refer to these types of regimes as “kleptocratic” regimes, which implies that the state is 
controlled and run for the benefit of an individual, or a small group, who use their power to transfer a 
large fraction of society’s resources to themselves (Acemoglu et al., 2004:162). Many countries within 
                                                                    
5
 Daren Acemoglu & James Robinson published a new book in 2013 with the title: Why Nations Fail: The Origins of 
Power, Prosperity, and Poverty. However, this book will not be addressed in this project.  
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Sub-Saharan Africa suffer under these types of regimes, and especially those countries rich on natural 
resources (Acemoglu et al., 2004:165). Going beyond Mehlum et al. (2006ab), Acemoglu et al. (2002) 
argues that the colonial past may also have something to say in the institutional development of a 
country. In the past, European colonialism has disrupted the social organisations, or led to the 
establishment or continuation of already existing extractive institutions in colonialized countries. In 
those colonies, where Europeans set up or took over extractive institutions, political power became 
concentrated in the hands of the few, who extracted resources from the rest of the population 
(Acemoglu et al., 2002:1264). 
 
3.8 Critical assessment of the institutional approach  
With our application of the institutional approach, set forth by Mehlum et al. (2006ab), it could be 
argued that the literature is deficient in some directions. First, different scholars have several times 
pointed to the concerns that the natural resource abundance indicator by Sachs and Warner (1995, 
1997), which is also used by Mehlum et al. (2006ab), is problematic. The problem lies with this 
particular indicator, which is the share of primary exports in GDP per exports (Sachs & Warner, 
1995:2-3). However, the indicator is argued only to capture the lack of non-resource sectors, rather than 
indicating whether a country is resource based or not. For instance would this same data today, if 
applied on countries like Norway or Australia, show, that these countries are resource poor, reflected by 
relatively small shares of primary exports. This is because Norway and Australia both have high 
resource abundance per capita, but also have a relatively large non-resource sector. In this sense it 
could be argued that the dominance of primary exports is an indication of how specialised a country is, 
and this may be related to the structure of the economy rather than to the resource curse (Bakwena et 
al., 2009:4).  
 
Robinson et al. (2006) point to the same problem, arguing that the measure of resource is endogenous. 
In the Congo under Mobutu, as the economy fell to pieces, the only sector left, apart from subsistence 
activities, was the extraction of resources. This yields some severe methodological problems for the 
omitted variables in the data by Sachs and Warner (Robinson et al. 2006:451), thus also in the research 
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by Mehlum et al (2006ab).  
 
Second, turning to the main hypothesis set forth by Mehlum et al. (2006ab) it could be argued, that the 
link between resource abundance  Economic performance, when taking institutions into account, 
depends on how resource abundance is defined and measured. Bruunscheweiler & Bulte (2008) point 
to the fact that it is challenging to find truly exogenous measures of resource abundance. The scholars 
argue that previous studies on resource abundance is defined as the ratio of resource exports to GDP, 
generally based on the information for a single year at the beginning of the observation period 
(Bruunschweiler & Bulte, 2008:249). However, when scholars use the current resources per capita as 
an independent variable in cross-country analysis it becomes a problem, if these countries have 
discovered oil at different years. Comparing their oil reserves at a given point in time may understate 
the extent of oil abundance for those who discovered and produced oil earlier on (Cotet & Tsui, 
2009:9).  
 
Furthermore, the ratio to measure oil is often thought of as a measure of resource dependence (or 
comparative advantage in resource products) and not as resource abundance. This denominator tends to 
measure the magnitude of other activities in the economy, which implies that the ratio variable is not 
independent of the institutions, in which they are produced. In this sense, the resource dependence 
suffers from endogeneity problems, and perhaps it should be treated as an exogenous variable. 
Conclusively the authors propose, that a better measure of resource abundance would reflect resource 
stocks (Bruunschweiler & Bulte, 2008:249). Therefore, these scholars state, that it can be valuable to 
distinguish between resource abundance (a stock measure of resource wealth), resource rents (the flow 
of income derived from the resource stock at some point in time) and resource dependence (the degree 
to which countries do—or do not—have access to alternative sources of income other than resource 
extraction, again at some point in time) (Bruunschweiler & Bulte 2008: 261).  
 
Third, Saad-Filho & Weeks point to the critical factor that many studies seek to demonstrate that 
resource abundance is correlated with poor growth. However, the scholars argue that, even if this 
correlation could be demonstrated, the causality might also be turned around. For instance poverty, low 
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skills and weak infrastructure might as well result in reliance on primary product exports, in which case 
the latter becomes a symptom of underdevelopment rather than its cause. It is also possible that poor 
performance could be caused by a third (omitted) variable (Saad-Filho & Weeks, 2013:5).  
 
In this sense, when dealing with the resource curse and resource abundance in general, different 
scholars question how to measure oil abundance properly, and how it should be applied in research. At 
the same time, the causality between resources, institutions and economic performance is not fixed. 
Besides other omitted variables, which may influence this link, it could also be argued that the curse 
simply does not exist. As argued by Bruunschweiler & Bulte (2008) the empirical relationship between 
institutional quality and resource dependence may just be a reflection of the fact, that countries with 
poor institutions are unlikely to develop non-primary production sectors to reduce their dependence on 
resource exports. If so, the causality would be from institutions to dependence, and not the other way 
around.  
 
Fourth, we would like to stress that we perceive the institutional approach by Mehlum et al (2006ab) as 
quite superficial. Many of the important concepts are not defined, which has forced us to interpret and 
redefine many of the variables and indicators used in their theory. In this sense, we have put our own 
fingerprints on this theory, when applied during the project.  
  
32 
 
4.0 Methodology  
In this section, we wish to clarify our methodological considerations and chosen methods, and argue 
how we are going to answer our problem formulation. First, we wish clarify our methodological 
considerations and purpose of this research. Following these sections, we will briefly present our case 
study, while also arguing for why we have chosen the case of Angola. Next, we will present our 
empirical data, while critically assessing the empirical framework. Finally, we will end this chapter 
with an operationalization of the institutional approach to clarify how we apply the theory in the 
analysis.   
 
4.1 Methodological considerations  
In this project, we have chosen to work with the NIE as our overall theoretical framework. In this sense 
NIE will be a part of our theoretical, as well as our ontological, point of departure. As mentioned in our 
theory chapter (page 17), the NIE approach moves beyond neoclassical theory with the assumption, 
that actors are not infinitely rational or have perfect information. To make up for this actors create 
institutions, which infer that the institutional structures governing the economy are as changeable as 
they are confining. In contrast to the more traditional approaches6, NIE opens up for the fact, that the 
agent, or entrepreneur in our case, make active choices that can affect the economic structures. For 
instance, when economic and political entrepreneurs chooses to either engage in rent-seeking or 
productive activities, this has a profound impact on the trajectory of the economy. Thus, our 
understanding of reality throughout this project will be shaped by the agency-structure duality, which is 
stressed by NIE. 
 
4.2 Purpose of research 
The purpose of this paper is primarily to test the robustness of the hypothesis of how and to what extent 
there is a link between resource abundance and economic performance, when the quality of institutions 
is taken into account within the case of Angola. Furthermore, this project serves as an in-depth analysis 
                                                                    
6 Please see literature review for an overview of the traditional approaches page 13.  
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of a resource abundant country, where the majority of research, in the resource abundance literature, 
seems to focus on cross-country analysis (Ross, 2014). In addition to this, in analysing the institutional 
quality of a country, that exhibits largely all the indicators of being resource cursed, the findings of this 
paper will contribute to either strengthening or weakening the hypothesis set forth by Mehlum et al. 
(2006ab). Consequently, we will be positioning ourselves in the on-going debate on the link between 
resources and economic performance in resource rich countries, which is what Rosser refers to as the 
rational actor strand (Rosser, 2006:15). Lastly, the findings of our analysis will add to the literature on 
whether, or to which degree, Angola is resource cursed.  
 
4.3 Case Study 
This paper will be based on a case study of Angola. Whilst working with a specific case it will enable 
us to understand the current and particular situation of Angola. A case study is an in-depth, contextual 
examination of a specific phenomenon (Flyvbjerg, 2010:464). The purpose of a case study is therefore 
not to find an universal explanation, independent from the studied context, but instead to cover and 
clarify the reality of a specific case (Bryman, 2012:68-69). One critique towards using a case study is 
that it is too subjective and does not depict an objective perspective (Flyvbjerg, 2010:478). However, 
we do not believe that any knowledge exists, which merely portrays an objective perspective. Thus, 
while constructing a project, as this one, we will always have a certain viewpoint and a certain 
objective (Flyvbjerg, 2010:479ff). In this sense, we argue, in line with Bent Flyvbjerg (2010), that 
context-bound knowledge is more valuable than the endless search for universal explanations.  
 
We find Angola an interesting case to examine; first, because it is one of the most frequently used cases 
to portray as a resource cursed country by academic scholars (Boschini et al. 2007; Niño & Le Billon, 
2013). Second, almost 90% of Angola’s export is based on the oil sector (Hammond, 2011:354), and 
according to both Bulte et al. and Auty countries rich on point resources like oil, is more vulnerable to 
exploitation by political elites (Bulte et al., 2005:1031; Auty, 2001:6). These countries:  
 
 
34 
 
“[…] are expected to have ‘‘bad policies,’’ and suffer from the so-called rentier effects, repression e
ffects, or policies that postpone the transition to competitive industrialization and diversification of t
he economy” (Bulte et al., 2005:1031).  
 
In this sense, Angola will work as a typical case, or an exemplifying case. This implies that our choice 
of Angola as a case is not because it is extreme or unusual in any way, merely because Angola will 
represent a broader category of cases and provide us with a suitable context for our problem 
formulation to be answered (Bryman, 2012:70). However, we do not claim that we can generalize 
based on this case study. Thus, all of our conclusions will only portray one picture of the case of 
Angola, and how we have studied this specific case. Therefore, the objective is to test the robustness of 
the hypothesis set forth by the institutional approach based on the typical case of Angola.  
 
4.4 Empirical Data 
In this chapter, we intend to present and critically assess our empirical framework and collection of 
data. We have gathered our empirical data by applying the so-called snowball-method, where one 
source will lead to the next (Lyngaard, 2012:141). By doing so, it creates an immense knowledge and 
makes possible to view the area of interest from several perspectives. Thus, we have been able to grasp 
the whole complexity of the debate as far as possible.  
 
As case studies frequently sites for both quantitative and qualitative research we have adopted the same 
approach of data triangulation (Bryman, 2012:68). Data triangulation is defined as: “[…] the 
combination of methodologies in the study of the same phenomenon” (Jick, 1979:602). It has often 
been argued that, by using data triangulation, one method (or type of data) will compensate for the 
weaknesses in the other (Jick, 1979:604). Thus, by combining different sets of data, our study seeks to 
be strengthened by gaining a more in-depth and comprehensive understanding of our problem 
formulation. In the next two sections, we will present our data collection, and how we have applied 
quantitative and qualitative data in the analysis, respectively. In the following section, we intend to 
reflect critically upon this data collection. Much of the gathered data within this empirical framework 
stems from different indices. As a courtesy to the reader, we have provided an overview of the use of 
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the different indices in appendix. 
 
4.4.1 Qualitative and quantitative data 
In the analysis, we will draw upon both quantitative and qualitative data in order to supplement our 
findings by data triangulation. We have chosen in the following section to combine the presentation of 
our data, as many of the sources draws upon both qualitative and quantitative data. Concerning the 
quantitative data, we will draw mostly upon statistics and different indices. Regarding the qualitative 
data we will draw mostly upon academic scholars and different reports by NGO´s and scientific 
departments, in order to put our findings from the quantitative analysis into perspective. We will now 
briefly introduce the most important data sources, how we will use their indices, and lastly critically 
reflect upon these. In the appendix, an overview of the used indices, including their scales and scores 
for Angola, can be found.  
 
Freedom House 
The Freedom House is a watchdog organisation, which is dedicated to promote freedom worldwide. 
The organisation rates, in its annually published “Freedom in the World” index, a country’s freedom in 
accordance to the criteria7: Freedom Rating, Civil Liberties and Political Rights on the scale from 1 (= 
best) to 7 (= worst). We will be drawing on these specific criteria in the analysis. The ratings are 
created by 60 analysts and 30 advisors, who base the ratings on academic and news articles, reports by 
other organisations and personal contacts. Furthermore, we will be drawing on their annual “Freedom 
in the World” reports and the book “Countries at the Crossroad 2011 Methodology Questions”. The 
Freedom House admits an inevitable element of subjectivity in their qualitative work, but through their 
internal reviews of the results, these shall be minimized as much as possible (Freedom House, 2014 
Methodology). 
 
 
                                                                    
7Moreover, the scores of seven subcomponents: Political Pluralism and Participation, Functioning of Government, Freedom 
of Expression and Belief, Associational and Organizational Rights, Rule of Law, Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights 
(Freedom House, 2014: Methodology). 
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Transparency International 
The NGO Transparency International’s ‘Corruption Perception Index’ (CPI) draws upon data gathered 
through expert and business surveys by acknowledged private institutions. This data is evaluated by 
Transparency International, based on different criteria, and rated on a scale of 0-100 (lowest level of 
corruption = 0) (Transparency International, Corruption by Country: Angola). In the analysis we will 
both be looking at the qualitative and quantitative data since we draw upon both the report “Expert 
Answers - overview of corruption and anti-corruption in Angola” and Angola’s scaling in the CPI.   
 
The European Commission has evaluated the method applied by Transparency International. The 
evaluation has composed a positive statistical assessment on TI’s current method. Amongst other 
things, the commission emphasise the high level of transparency, lack of biases and the conceptually 
and statistically coherence (Saisana et al., 2012:21). According to the Transparency International, as 
corruption is in general is difficult to measure, the qualitative data collection will serve with a more 
thorough perspective, than that of quantitative data.  Therefore, they state: “Capturing perceptions of 
corruption, of those in a position to offer assessments of public sector corruption, is the most reliable 
method of comparing relative corruption levels across countries” (Transparency International, 2014 
Corruption Perception Index 2014: In Detail).    
 
The Fund for Peace 
The Fund for Peace is a non-profit educational organization, which publishes annually the Fragile 
States Index. We will be looking at two of their indicators; State Legitimacy and Rule of Law. The 
index analyses the fragility of states, which receive a rating according to the score, categorizing them in 
terms of stability-fragility-dichotomy as “Alert”, “Warning”, “Stable” and “Sustainable”. These ratings 
are based on 12 multidimensional subcomponents, of which we will focus on: Uneven Economic 
Development, Poverty and Economic Decline, State Legitimacy, Human Rights and Rule of Law. 
These subcomponents are rated on a scale from 1 (= best) to 10 (= worst). The Fund for Peace works 
with an analytical software (called Conflict Assessment System Tool), which calculates scores on 
scientific articles. This is additionally supplemented with quantitative and qualitative data linked to 
current events in the country, in order to avoid one-sided and subjective results (Fund for Peace, 2014 
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Methodology).  
Heritage Foundation 
In the analysis, the Index of Economic Freedom by the think tank Heritage Foundation will be used to 
draw on data from their examinations of Rule of Law. They define Rule of Law through two indicators: 
‘Property Rights’ and ‘Freedom from Corruption’. Different institutions and organizations (specified in 
the appendix) gather the data on both Property Rights and Freedom from Corruption. Hereafter, the 
sources are compared and assessed on a scale from 0-100 (100 being the most effective protection of 
property rights or least perceived level of corruption). The indices are updated annually with the newest 
information, and in order to enable comparison between countries they only examine gathered data 
from the same time span in all countries (Heritage Foundation, 2014 Index of Economic Freedom: 
Methodology).  
 
World Bank Group  
World Bank Group has produced a couple of indices that we find interesting to use in our analysis. The 
World Bank Group consists of the World Bank (WB), Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency 
(MIGA), International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) and International Finance 
Corporation (IFC) (World Bank, 2014 FAQs). They have a common goal of: reducing poverty through 
knowledge sharing (World Bank, 2014 About: What We Do).  
 
First of all, we will be drawing upon the Worldwide Governance Index (WGI), which will be used in 
the analysis to examine the Government Effectiveness, which is defined as: “[...] the quality of public 
services, the capacity of the civil service and its independence from political pressures; and the quality 
of policy formulation”. Furthermore, we would like to include the aspect of Rule of Law, which consist 
of:  
 “[...] the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, including the 
quality of contract enforcement and property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the 
likelihood of crime and violence.” (Kaufmann et al., 2009:1).  
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Like the indices above the data, on which WGI is relying, has been carried out by NGOs and private 
and public sector organisations. The data has been gathered using different methods, capturing views 
and experiences of experts and other informants through for an example households and firm surveys 
(Kaufmann et al., 2009:1). The World Bank Group argue that using perceptions to measure the different 
indicators will contribute to a much better understanding of the reasoning of firms and household 
decisions, and capture governance outcomes in reality (World Bank Group, 2014 FAQs).  
 
Finally, we will be drawing on data from the Doing Business Project by the World Bank Group. They 
state that this project contributes with “[...] objective measures of business regulations and their 
enforcement (World Bank Group, 2014 About Doing Business). We will include the ranking of Ease of 
Doing Business, and we will specifically focus on the category: Enforcing Contracts and the sub-
category: strength of legal rights index. The ranking is based on a scale from 1 (weak) to 12 (strong). 
The data is collected with surveys evaluated and revaluated by 9,000 local experts and “[...]study of the 
codes of civil procedure and other court regulations as well as questionnaires“, respectively (World 
Bank, Metadata). 
 
The Doing Business Project is ranking countries based on their ease of doing business. The countries 
are ranked from 1-189. If a country has a low ease of doing business it shows that the business 
environment, in the specific country, is less conducive, regarding establishing and operating firms. The 
ranking is calculated by comparing economies, and their business regulations of medium-size and 
smaller companies through 10 different topics (World Bank Group, 2014 Doing Business, Ranking; 
World Bank Group, 2014 About Doing Business). It would therefore be interesting for us to examine 
some of the expert conducted enterprise surveys, which include face-to-face interviews with more than 
130,000 companies (World Bank Group, 2014 Survey Methodology; World Bank Group 2014, About 
us).  
 
4.4.2 Critical assessment of the empirical framework 
In this subchapter, we intend to critically reflect upon our empirical material. While using the so-called 
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‘snow-ball method’ we have looked critically upon the collected materials, and especially questioned 
the origin of the data. We have sought to do this by seeking inspiration in the critical perspective on 
sources by Vibeke Ankersborg. Ankersborg argues that it is of utmost importance to view your material 
critically, because it is man-made (Ankersborg, 2007:16). By applying this perspective when gathering 
and interpreting our sources, we have sought to bring in much more transparency regarding our data 
collection process. According to Ankersborg, the producer of the material always has a certain 
objective and a particular message, when writing an article, document, index etc. (Ankersborg, 
2007:63). It has therefore been important for us to question and critically reflect upon why the indices 
have been created and in which context. Thus, we have tried to apply this critical perspective including 
the context, not merely accept anything as being neutral, and be open towards new knowledge, when 
testing this hypothesis (Ankersborg, 2007:59).  
 
When working with the Heritage Foundation and their Index of Economic Freedom it has to be noted, 
that the Heritage Foundation is an American think tank, whose mission is to promote conservative 
public policies based on the principles of free enterprise, limited government, individual freedom and 
traditional American values (Heritage Foundation, 2014 About Heritage). Thus, it has to be taken into 
consideration that a possible outcome of the indices, used from this foundation, is shaped by neoliberal 
values. According to Ankersborg, the producer will always be represented by a specific culture, 
education or a certain political perspective (Ankersborg, 2007:63). In this sense, we have to recognize 
that our material may represent a certain point of view, and might have been created to depict this 
specific view.  
 
Likewise, when dealing with the NGO Transparency International it has to be noted, that the 
organization has received much criticism for conducting indices based on perceptions. Especially the 
fact that it is based on opinions by a small group of experts and businesspeople is put forward as a main 
critique. As stated by research fellow at the Centre for Global Development, Alex Cobham: “This 
embeds a powerful and misleading elite bias in popular perceptions of corruption and can lead to 
inappropriate policy responses” (Cobham 2013; Foreign Policy, Corrupting Perceptions).  
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In this sense, we cannot exclude the fact that the results from these perceptions are influenced by 
subjective perceptions, that may change over time. This could lead to the so-called Halo-effect, coined 
by psychologist, Edward Thorndike in 1920. Phil Rosenzweig argues in his book: The Halo Effect from 
2007 that researches have to be careful, gathering data that are based on the Halo Effect, as these 
findings may seems suspect. He argues:  
 
“Much of our thinking about company performance is shaped by the halo effect […] when a company is 
growing and profitable, we tend to infer that it has a brilliant strategy, a visionary CEO, motivated 
people, and a vibrant culture. When performance falters, we're quick to say the strategy was misguided, 
the CEO became arrogant, the people were complacent, and the culture stodgy […]” (The Economist, 
the Halo Effect).  
 
We have in this sense tried to be critical towards the CPI from Transparency International by drawing 
upon other indices concerning corruption within Angola. By applying both quantitative statistics from 
other organisations, while also including the CPI, we have tried to accommodate this criticism as much 
as possible.  
 
Furthermore, the World Bank has identified limitations on their work, and criticism can be formulated 
regarding two points: 1. Spatial challenges: the data collected for the Doing Business Project and the 
Strength of Legal Rights Index are mainly focusing on the city, with the strongest economy in the 
country, therefore not representative for all geographical and economic dimensions. 2. Challenges of 
the business type: the data often refers to a particular type of business, e.g. focusing on the companies 
of a certain size, which does not allow us to draw a conclusion on the entire business environment 
(World Bank, 2014 Metadata). 
 
As a last point, we will mention that we are aware that secondary sources are always a depiction of 
other people’s experience or research, which is per definition attached to insecurity (Ankersborg, 
2007:59). Therefore, we have tried to be critical towards the objective and point of view of the data, 
especially concerning the different non-governmental organisations, which we acknowledge have a 
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possible political and ideological agenda. However, we will use secondary sources in able to gain an 
understanding of the current situation in Angola. These sources will give us knowledge, which would 
otherwise have been unattainable.  
 
4.5 Operationalization 
In the theoretical chapter (page 18) we derived from Mehlum et al. (2006ab) that institutions of high 
quality are defined as producer-friendly institutions, whereas institutions of low quality are defined as 
grabber-friendly institutions. It was further clarified, that in determining the level of institutional 
quality, the following areas would be applied in the analysis as analytical indicators: rule of law, 
bureaucratic quality, corruption in government and the business environment (Mehlum et al. 2006b: 
1127). In this sense, when operationalized, these analytical indicators will work both as analytical 
strategy, but also as analytical indicators in determining the quality of institutions in Angola.  
 
It was furthermore clarified in the theoretical chapter that we perceive institutions as “the rules of the 
game”, which includes both formal and informal rules. We will in each section of the operationalization 
delineate which rules we will be looking at, when determining the rules of the game. We have chosen 
to operationalize the four analytical indicators in this way:  
 
4.5.1 Analytical indicators for the quality of institutions 
1. Rule of law 
In order to apply this analytical indicator in the analysis our primary source, of measuring rule of law in 
Angola, will be the World Governance Indicators by the World Bank. These indicators will allow us to 
determine the rule of law, government effectiveness and regulatory quality within Angola (World Bank 
Group, 2014 Rule of Law, Worldwide Governance Indicators). This will also provide an insight into the 
analytical indicator of bureaucratic quality, which will be clarified in the next indicator. Moreover, we 
will draw upon the Fragile States Index by The Fund for Peace, in order to assess the state legitimacy 
and rule of law within Angola. For instance, a low score on these indices would imply a weak rule of 
law, which would indicate a grabber-friendly institution.  
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Property rights will also be addressed together with the analytical indicator of rule of law and the 
formal rules of the game. We intend to measure whether property rights are ill-defined or well-defined 
in Angola, by including specific data and reports on the state of property rights in Angola. These will be 
derived from the Index of Economic Freedom by the Heritage Foundation, the Freedom in the World 
Ranking by Freedom House, and Strength of Legal Rights Index by the World Bank. We will 
supplement our findings of the rule of law in Angola, by including a qualitative report by the 
Bertelsmann Index, and academic scholars such as Shaxson (2009) and De Oliveira (2007). These 
qualitative findings will be applied in order to critically assess our quantitative conclusions, but also to 
gain an in-depth perspective of the rule of law in Angola.  
 
2. Bureaucratic quality 
The analytical indicator of bureaucratic quality is closely linked to the analytical indicator of the rule of 
law. During the analysis these two indicators will we combined in order to supplement one another, and 
also show the formal rules of the game. Thus, the indices to measure the rule of law will also be drawn 
upon in the analytical indicator of the bureaucratic quality.  
We therefore intend to measure the level of bureaucratic quality by using the World Governance 
Indicators (WGI). This index focuses among others on the components: Government Effectiveness and 
Regulatory Quality. Since the Regulatory Quality is related to the ability of policy implementation, and 
Government Effectiveness includes the government’s credibility and freedom from political pressures, 
we will supplement these findings with the Freedom in the World Index. This includes the freedom 
rating, civil liberties and political rights, but also the functioning of the government and rule of law. 
These indices will provide us with a general idea of the level of bureaucracy and the political 
framework in Angola, as the scores will lead us in the direction of either grabber-friendly or producer-
friendly institutions.  
As in the analytical indicator of the rule of law, we will supplement our findings of bureaucratic quality 
in Angola, by including a qualitative report by the Bertelsmann Index, and academic scholars such as 
Shaxson (2009) and De Oliveira (2007). These qualitative findings will provide us with a broader 
insight into the political framework of Angola, while also being able to critically reflect upon our 
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quantitative findings.  
 
3. Corruption in government 
The degree of corruption should serve to illustrate how the informal and formal rules of the game are 
governing the practices of either productive or unproductive activities in Angola. In this sense, this 
analytical indicator will also draw upon the analytical indicator of rule of law. In order to assess this, 
we will include the Strengths of Legal Rights Index by the World Bank to ascertain the level of 
corruption within the formal rules of the game.   
To evaluate the level of corruption and anti-corruption measures in Angola, we will apply the 
‘Corruption Perceptions Index’ (CPI) of Transparency International, the Country at the Crossroads 
analysis by Freedom House, and the Index of Economic Freedom by the Heritage Foundation. These 
indices measure corruption through the perception of business people and country experts, and provide 
both a general score and detailed reports on corruption practices, based on qualitative and quantitative 
data. This also entails that the efficiency of anti-corruption measures will, in a likewise manner, provide 
information about the institutional quality of Angola. In this sense, by measuring corruption in Angola, 
and grasping all the different perceptions, we intend to use this data as an indicator for how grabber-
friendly or producer-friendly the institutions in Angola are.  
 
4. Business environment 
When considering the important impact of entrepreneurship on the economy, one of the most crucial 
areas, where the rule of law has an impact, is in the business environment. We see the business 
environment as an important analytical indicator of whether the rule of law constitutes a strong or weak 
institution in Angola. In determining the quality of the business environment in Angola, we intend to 
draw upon data from the World Bank's Doing Business Project, which provides measures of business 
regulations and their enforcement. We will furthermore draw upon the Global Entrepreneurship 
Monitor by the London Business School and Babson College. This data will be compared to the CPI by 
Transparency International, as this index consists of perceptions by the business elites and experts 
within this field.  
We intend to draw upon both qualitative and quantitative data, in order to grasp the informal rules of 
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the game within the business environment. This data will show us the measure of the ease of starting a 
business, the enforcement of contracts, and protection of minority investors, and from this we intend to 
get an idea of whether or not there are incentives for taking part in productive activities in Angola.  
 
Drawing upon these four analytical indicators we intend to analyse the institutional quality in Angola. 
By first delineating the economic performance within our time frame, we intend to use the findings of 
the quality of institutions to answer our problem formulation. In this sense we will test the robustness 
of the hypothesis concerning the possible link between resource abundance  economic performance, 
when having either low- or high quality of institutions. The four analytical indicators are difficult to 
separate both in reality and in theory. Therefore, we are aware that they will merge and overlap at 
times. However, as a courtesy to the reader we have chosen to divide them into individual indicators in 
order to provide a more clear structure during the analysis.  
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5.0 Analysis 
In this chapter we seek to analyse the case of Angola from an institutional perspective, in order to test 
the robustness of the hypothesis set forth by Mehlum et al. (2006ab), and in this sense answer our 
problem formulation. We have chosen to divide our analysis into four parts, which will end up in an 
analytical discussion. 
 
First, we seek to present the economic performance in Angola within our chosen time frame. This 
section will provide the basis for the entire analysis, as we seek to analyse to what extent and how the 
quality of institutions determine whether natural resource abundance have a negative or positive impact 
on economic performance, in the case of Angola. Second, the analysis will provide a section on the 
quality of institutions based on quantitative data. Thirdly, we will analyse and discuss this outcome 
based on qualitative data in the section that follows. These first five parts will all be analysed 
accordingly with our four analytical indicators, as presented in the operationalization, in order to 
determine the institutional quality in Angola. These indicators are: rule of law, bureaucratic quality, 
corruption in government and the business environment. These will be drawn upon when relevant, and 
will not occur in this specific order. In the fourth part we will present a subsection on the national-oil 
company Sonangol, in order to go in-depth with the oil-industry in Angola. Fifth and finally, we will 
present an analytical discussion based on our findings in the first four sections. 
 
In the appendix, an overview of the used indices is presented, which shows not only the scale of the 
key components, but as well the scores of Nigeria and Botswana. These scores will be drawn upon 
during the analysis, as we wish to use them as a comparative scale, to put the dimensions of the results 
of Angola into perspective. Both Botswana and Nigeria are resource abundant Sub-Saharan countries, 
like Angola, of diamonds and oil respectively. The comparison to both cases can show the development 
possibilities for a country, which is resource abundant, and provide the reader with a better 
understanding of the actual situation of Angola. 
46 
 
5.1 The economic performance in Angola 
In this section we find it important to briefly introduce the economic performance in Angola, from 
2006-2013, which is our chosen time frame. In order to present the economic performance, we have 
chosen to look at GDP growth, but also include structural transformation. 
 
We understand structural transformation as the reallocation of economic activity in order to develop 
new, more productive economic activities, and movement of resources to newer sectors. Long-term 
growth and prosperity will only be achieved if these changes emerge in an economy (African 
Economic Outlook, 2013 Taking Stock on Africa’s Structural). The factors that have been identified as 
drivers for structural transformation are: human capital accumulation and skills, competitive exchange 
rates, a big agricultural sector, which offers great potential for development to the industrial sector, and 
governance efficiency (African Economic Outlook, 2013 Taking Stock on Africa’s Structural). 
Especially the last factor is of interest in this analysis – in order to identify the quality of the institutions 
in Angola, dysfunctional democracy, and the connection to government inefficiency, could support the 
assumption that a grabber-friendly environment hampers economic performance.  
 
Regarding the agricultural sector, the Figure 2 (see page 48) shows that this economic branch is only 
constituting a minor part of the GDP. Nevertheless, 85% of the population are employed in this sector 
(World Fact Book, 2014 Angola), which does not seem to be very profitable. Due to the fact that the 
agricultural sector offers employment to such a big part of the Angolans, it can be seen as a large sector, 
where the potential to upgrade exists. Moreover, the oil sector employs only 1% of the people in the 
labour force and the unemployment rate is 26% (The African Report, 2014 Angola’s economy grows, 
but what about the poor). Regarding the employment structures, there evidently is potential to develop 
structurally. 
 
Manufacturing as part of the industrial sector makes only a small part of the GDP: in 2008 5% of the 
GDP derived from this area, while in 2012 it was 6.6% (Muzima & Mazivila, 2014:4). This shows that 
there has been only very little change towards a structural transformation, which would be determined 
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by diversification and deepening in order to achieve more growth in the sector. However, there is no 
deindustrialization to prove that the economic performance is worsening. Nevertheless, in the case of 
Angola, it is difficult to clearly grasp a de facto structural transformation. It has to be taken into 
consideration that these are official numbers – in 2007, 42% of the GDP had its origin in the shadow 
economy (African Development Bank, 2014 Size of the shadow economy and easy of doing business), 
and there is only data existing for 1992, which indicates the share of employment in the industrial 
sector (20.6%) (Trading Economics, 2014 Employment in industry (% of total employment) in Angola). 
These puzzling numbers and the difficulty to find new data in this area can be seen as clear evidence 
that structural transformation in terms of employment and diversification is hardly existing. 
  
However, further development towards economic structural transformation is possible. Nevertheless, 
the focus shall be on governance efficiency, since it is closely linked to the institutional quality. The 
analysis of this factor could explain the economic patterns in the country in the time from 2006-2013, 
and easily can be linked to the assumptions by Mehlum et al. (2006ab). Differences between the GDP 
per capita and the GNI per capita might suggest, that the importance of the oil sector perpetuates only 
this particular branch, and GDP does not entail much information about the citizens’ situation. 
According to the IMF, Angola is one of the countries with the greatest gaps between GDP/capita and 
GNI/capita from 2000 to 2012 (IMF, 2014:25). In terms of GDP growth, Angola had a tremendous 
growth with annual rates around 20% prior to the global financial crisis in 2008, and slowly recovered 
from the crisis-related slowdown, to achieve 5% growth in 2013 (Trading Economics, 2014 Angola 
GDP Growth Rate; Angola GDP) (Please see figure 1) 
48 
 
 
 
When taking a closer look at the structural transformation related to the classic economic sectors 
(agriculture, industry, services), there has been little change in the country. The strongest sector in 
Angola is the industrial, to which the oil extraction industry belongs. Manufacturing is included in the 
industrial sector as well, but as mentioned above, it plays a much smaller role. Only in 2009, the 
industrial sector shrunk, and the service sector slowly expanded (World Bank, 2014 Economy and 
Growth), showing no more than minor changes. 
 
 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
GDP in Billion US Dollar 28,2 41,8 60,5 84,3 75,5 82,5 104,1 115,3
Annual GDP Growth Rate in % 20,6 18,6 23,2 13,8 2,4 3,4 3,9 5,2
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Figure 1: GDP in Angola - Total Value and Growth Rate
Source: own elaboration based on Trading Economics, 2014ab
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Figure 2: % of Economic Sectors of GDP
Source: own elaboration based on data by the World Bank 2014, Economy and 
Growth
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This could be related to the global price volatility of oil, which was affected during the crisis. 
Moreover, the oil sector solely made over 40% of the total GDP in the country between 2009 - 2013, 
leading to a significant dependence, since over two third of the tax revenues and grants are connected 
to the extractive industry (World Bank, 2013:50-51). This categorizes Angola as a resource-driven 
country, because more than 30% of the GDP derive from resource extraction (African Economic 
Outlook, 2013 Taking Stock on Africa’s Structural Transformation). 
 
5.2 Institutional quality in Angola – a quantitative analysis 
In order to analyse the institutional quality in Angola we have found it helpful to divide this section into 
subchapters, which draws upon our analytical indicators. In this sense each subsection within the 
quantitative analysis will draw upon the stated indicators. However, as mentioned, we are aware that 
the indicators will merge at different times during the analysis. 
 
5.2.1 The indicators of rule of law and bureaucratic quality 
We have chosen to combine the two analytical indicators: rule of law and bureaucratic quality, as they 
are merged in many of the indices we draw upon. 
 
Starting with the World Governance Indicators (WGI), this index focuses among others8 on the 
components: “Government Effectiveness” and “Rule of Law”, which we find important to assess, in 
order to analyse the formal rules of the game within Angola. The scale of the WGI measures these 
indicators in the range of -2.5 (weak performance) to 2.5 (strong performance). Since 2006 until 2013, 
Angola’s score has been rather stable, reaching around -1.3 points in the category “Rule of Law”. This 
shows a rather negative picture, just as in the aspect of “Government Effectiveness”, where Angola 
reached the score of -1.27 in 2013, and showed only little improvement in 2009, reaching -0.97. 
Regarding the component “Regulatory Quality”, Angola has shown only slight improvements in the 
time from 2006 to 2013, improving from a score of -1.14 to -1,05 (World Bank Group, 2014, Rule of 
Law). 
                                                                    
8
 WGI focuses on the following components: “Voice and Accountability”, “Political Stability and Absence of Violence”, 
“Government Effectiveness”, “Regulatory Quality”, “Rule of Law” and “Control of Corruption“. 
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Since the “Regulatory Quality” is related to the ability of policy implementation, and “Government 
Effectiveness” includes the government’s credibility and freedom from political pressures, the results 
of this index can be perceived as a critical aspect, addressing the crucial element of formal rules.  
Moreover, the category “Rule of Law” is linked to property rights by the WGI, and in combination with 
the two other key factors, the very first impression is the fact that their governance performance is 
weak, regarding formal rules of the game. These formal rules of the game seem to imply that Angola 
has low-quality institutions, since they have a weak score on both of the analytical indicators of rule of 
law and bureaucratic quality. Following the logic from our hypothesis (Mehlum et al., 2006ab), a low 
quality of institutions will lead a resource abundant country, like Angola, to become resource cursed. 
 
 
Since this collection of indicators by the WGI is very complex and dense, it is worth taking the 
comparative cases of Nigeria and Botswana into consideration, in order to put these findings into a 
broader perspective. Both countries have better scores than Angola in all three categories; especially 
Botswana reaches results over the value of 0, towards a strong performance. However, this difference is 
also addressed my Mehlum et al. (2006ab), as they point to Botswana as a success-story, implying that 
because of good-quality institutions, Botswana has managed to turn their resource abundance into a 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Score Government Effectiveness
Angola
-1,37 -1,24 -1,07 -0,97 -1,13 -1,15 -1,02 -1,26
Score Voice and Accountability
Angola
-1,26 -1,17 -1,13 -1,13 -1,12 -1,12 -1,07 -1,12
Score Regulatory Quality -1,14 -1,04 -1,06 -1,02 -1,02 -1,08 -0,98 -1,05
-1,6
-1,4
-1,2
-1
-0,8
-0,6
-0,4
-0,2
0
Figure 3: Results from the World Governance Indicators
Source: Own elaboration based on World Bank Group, 2014, Rule of Law
Score Government Effectiveness Angola Score Voice and Accountability Angola
Score Regulatory Quality
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blessing, rather than a curse (Mehlum et al. 2006b:1117). 
 
Addressing our analytical indicator of bureaucratic quality, it is fruitful to shift the perspective from 
capabilities to freedom. The “Freedom in the World Index”, published by the think tank “Freedom 
House”, highlights several aspects that have to be taken into account for the analysis of the quality of 
institutions. The index has an overall freedom status, rating countries as free, partly free or unfree. 
Moreover, there are three subcategories (“Freedom Rating”, “Civil Liberties” and “Political Rights”), 
which are rated from 1 (best) to 7 (worst). Angola’s overall rating is “unfree”, and the country reaches 
only low scores on the subcategories, and they have not changed at all since 2006. For the Freedom 
Rating, only a score of 5.5 points has been reached, the Civil Liberties score is 5 and the Political 
Rights score 6, drawing a negative picture of the situation (Freedom House, 2014 Freedom in the 
World: Angola). 
 
Furthermore, these ratings are based on seven further subcomponents9, and in order to determine the 
institutional quality, two of them appear to be very interesting: “Functioning of the Government”, and 
“Rule of Law”, where 16 points each can be achieved, but Angola scores in the first case only 1 point, 
and in the second 4 (Freedom House, 2014 Freedom in the World: Angola). 
 
Additionally, the Fund for Peace has identified in its Fragile States Index, in which it rates countries 
from 1 (= best) to 10 (= worst), that in the categories “State Legitimacy” and “Violation of Human 
Rights and Rule of Law” Angola performs very poorly, reaching only 8.6 and 7.3 points respectively 
(Fund for Peace, 2013 Failed States Index 2013). This can be interpreted as a very negative picture 
regarding the rule of law. 
 
Concerning our analytical indicator of bureaucratic quality, this implies that Angola has low-quality 
formal institutions, thus grabber-friendly institutions. Mehlum et al. refers to this as dysfunctional 
                                                                    
9These seven subcomponents are: Electoral Process, Political Pluralism and Participation, Functioning of Government, 
Freedom of Expression and Belief, Associational and Organizational Rights, Rule of Law and Personal Autonomy and 
Individual Rights. 
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democracies, which invite political rent appropriation, corruption and weak protection of citizen’s 
rights among others. (Mehlum et al., 2006b:1121). To enhance this argument it will be necessary to 
address the analytical indicator of corruption in government. 
5.2.2 The indicator of corruption in government 
Drawing upon our indicator of corruption in government, corruption in Angola appears to be an evident 
challenge that hampers the functioning of the governmental processes, and law enforcement (Freedom 
House, 2014 Freedom in the World: Angola). The Index of Economic Freedom by the Heritage 
Foundation supports these assumptions. This index has a global ranking of 178 countries, in which 
Angola was on 120th position in 2013. Additionally a scale for the components “Rule of Law”, 
“Limited Government”, “Regulatory Efficiency” and “Open Markets” from 0 (worst) to 100 (best), can 
be analysed. Especially the component “Rule of Law” is of significant interest in this regard, since it 
includes the aspect of “Property Rights”, and “Freedom from Corruption”. While Angola reaches a 
total score of 47.3, these two factors are its greatest weaknesses, where the country scores only 15 and 
20 points respectively (Heritage Foundation, 2014 Index of Economic Freedom: Graph the Data). 
While the rating for “Freedom from Corruption” has stayed almost stable since 2006, the indicator for 
“Property Rights” has fallen from a score of 30 in 2006, to 15 in 2013 (Heritage Foundation, 2014 
Index of Economic Freedom: Graph the Data). 
 
Although the country has improved in terms of economic freedom by over 20 points in total during the 
last two decades, the Heritage Foundation explicitly states that: “the lack of capable public institutions 
and weak rule of law continue to undermine the successful implementation of other critical reforms” 
(Miller et al., 2014: 97), because Angola’s overall long-term improvement of the score is not related to 
the indicators of property rights and corruption. Again, the indices by the Freedom House and the 
Heritage Foundation lead to the assumption, that the institutions in Angola are grabber-friendly, and 
lack the necessary strength of property rights, in order to define the institutions, and in this sense, the 
rules of the game. This was considered by Ronald Coase as a basic element for successful business 
(Coase, 1960:6). The low-institutional quality of the formal rules of the game, will also provide 
incentives for entrepreneurs to engage in rent-seeking activities, according to Mehlum et al. (2006ab), 
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or redistributive activities according to North (2011). This low quality institutional framework shapes 
the trajectory of the Angolan economy, and is likely to have long-term consequences for the country’s 
economic performance (North 2011: 23). 
 
A further index supporting the evidence for a weak regulatory framework and poor property rights, is 
the World Bank’s “Strength of Legal Rights Index”, which: “[…] measures the degree to which 
collateral and bankruptcy laws protect the rights of borrowers and lenders and thus facilitate lending” 
(World Bank, 2014 Metadata). The index scores countries on a scale from 0 (weak) to 12 (strong). In 
2013 Angola reached a score of 1, showing a negative trend, since their score was 3 from 2006-2012 
(World Bank, 2014 Strength of Legal Rights Index). Again this index shows the poor performance in 
terms of rule of law in Angola, drawing a picture of an ongoing worsening in this regard. 
 
In terms of the analytical indicators of rule of law, bureaucratic quality and corruption from 
government, the evidence from the indices seem to imply that formal institutions in Angola could be 
compared to a kleptocratic regime (Acemoglu et al., 2004). This means that the state seem to be 
controlled and run for the benefit of a small group of individuals. As entrepreneurs tend to pursue rent-
seeking activities, which the institutional structures promotes the incentives for, the rents are not 
channelled into the productive economy to create wealth, and increase the economic performance in 
Angola. In order to further this argument, it will be important to draw upon our last analytical indicator, 
which is the business environment. 
5.2.3 The indicator of business environment 
In order to conclude on the rule of law indicator, it is quite important to include the indicator of the 
business environment, since the strength of formal rules and effective law enforcement can enable 
flourishing economic developments for entrepreneurs. Two indices reveal further information on the 
situation in Angola: The Doing Business Project by the World Bank, and the Corruption Perception 
Index by the NGO Transparency International, which focuses on the opinions of the economic elite in 
the country. 
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The Doing Business Project compares 189 countries based on different categories10. Focussing on the 
general factor of “Ease of Doing Business” and “Enforcing Contracts”, Angola is on rank 181 and 187 
respectively, reaching the bottom in the worldwide comparison. Moreover, the aspect “Protecting 
Minority Investors” gives further information about the quality of institutions, and the Angolan 
business environment. Although the two factors of “Ease of Doing Business” and “Enforcing 
Contracts” draws a picture of grabber-friendly institutions in Angola, the country is ranked 94th 
regarding the protection of investors, which might be linked to the anti-corruption laws that will be 
introduced later in the analysis, in the qualitative part (World Bank Group, 2014 Doing Business: 
Economy Rankings). 
 
However, drawing upon our analytical indicator of corruption in government, Angola does seem to be 
influenced by widespread corruption when looking at the indices. In a World Bank survey including 
360 small-, medium- and large-scale businesses, 51 % reported that they had experienced at least one 
bribe payment request. This should be compared to the Sub-Saharan average of 23 %. Additionally, 
according to the World Bank Enterprise Survey, 39 % of Angolan firms expect to give gifts to 
government officials in order to gain an operating license (World Bank Group, 2010). Again this should 
be compared to the Sub-Saharan average of 28% (World Bank Group, 2010). 
 
Following North (2005), these statistics tell a story about the informal norms and rules governing 
entrepreneurship in Angola, and the incentives for engaging in either productive activities, such as 
establishing a business, or unproductive activities such as taking bribes. The high level of corruption in 
Angola, that the statistics seem to reflect, would initially hint that the obstacles to engaging in 
productive activities are so high, that it does not pay off to be productive. Yet, according to the Global 
Entrepreneurship Monitor, 66 % of Angolans believe that the opportunities for starting up a business 
are good, and 72 % believe that they have the necessary skills in order to start a business (Herrington & 
                                                                    
10The “Doing Business Project” ranks 189 countries in the following categories: “Ease of Doing Business”, “Starting a 
Business”, “Dealing with Construction Permits”, “Getting Electricity”, “Registering property”, “Getting 
Credit”,  “Protecting Minority Investors”, “Paying Taxes”, “Trading Across Borders”, “Enforcing Contracts” and 
“Resolving Insolvency”. 
55 
 
Kelley, 2012:22). In addition to this, the new business ownership rate in Angola is 4 % higher than the 
regional average, suggesting that the Angolan population are not scared off by high corruption rates 
(Herrington & Kelley, 2012: 27). 
 
This contrasts the initial gloomy outlook that the CPI gives of the weight and allocation of productive 
and unproductive activities in the country. It should be noted though, that the level of entrepreneurs is 
correlated with whether the country is a factor driven economy (an economy at an early developmental 
stage largely dependent on natural resources), and whether it is a high-, middle-, or low-income 
country. This is because industrialisation typically leads to more job opportunities in larger companies, 
which displaces some entrepreneurial activity (ibid.). In countries with lower GDP per capita, early 
stage entrepreneurial activity is usually higher, and usually out of necessity, and Angola show one of 
the highest early stage entrepreneurial activity rates in the world. 
 
However, the CPI shows that out of 175 countries, Angola is on 153rdt position, reaching a score of 23, 
while on this particular scale of 0 to 100, a lower number means more corruption (Transparency 
International, 2013 Corruption Perception Index 2013). According to this index, the corruption levels 
have been stable in the last years, showing only minor decreases. The stability of the level at this points 
of the analysis reminds us, that we must be careful when interpreting the data and the results, as some 
indices have shown decreases and trends of worsening, while the CPI does not confirm these trends. 
Some components like “Monetary Freedom” within the “Index of Economic Freedom” by the Heritage 
Foundation shows improvements (Miller et al., 2014:98). 
 
In order to briefly put this into perspective, it should be emphasised that both Botswana and Nigeria 
perform better in terms of corruption when comparing their results on the “Corruption Perception 
Index” (CPI) (Transparency International, 2014 Corruption Perception Index 2014: Results). The better 
performance of both countries can be seen as well in the appendix. 
 
The indices seem to suggest that Angola has grabber-friendly institutions, as the quantitative analysis 
show low quality institutions based on all the indicators. Mehlum et al. (2006ab) would denote this as 
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the displacement effect, as it reduces national income, because entrepreneurs move from production to 
grabbing. This seem to strengthen the hypothesis set forth by the institutional approach, that oil 
abundance, leads a resource curse, when having grabber-friendly institutions.  
 
However, one must be cautious when analysing the different elements of these indices, and which 
conclusion can be drawn from them. We therefore seek to widen our perspective by including 
qualitative data, in order to fully determine whether Angola has bad (grabber-friendly) or good 
institutions (producer-friendly), and how this impacts their economic performance.  
5.2.4 Sub conclusion on the quantitative analysis 
From the quantitative analysis we seem to find empirical evidence for the fact that Angola has low-
quality institutions, based on all four analytical indicators. With regard to the analytical indicators: rule 
of law and bureaucratic quality, Angola is found to score a low performance on both. The formal rules 
of the game in Angola are in this sense characterized by bureaucratic inefficiency, corruption and a 
dysfunctional democracy. Angola even has the lowest score when compared to both Nigeria and 
Botswana, which support the findings of low-quality institutions. 
 
Furthermore, turning to the indicator of corruption in government, it seems as if both formal and 
informal rules of the game are influenced by widespread corruption, both in the private and public 
sector. With regard to the analytical indicator of the business environment, it becomes evident that 
entrepreneurs have more incentives to engage in rent-seeking activities or unproductive activities, as 
the institutional framework within Angola is structured to provide these incentives. 
 
As mentioned in the economic performance of Angola, the major rents in the economy are derived 
from resource rents. As this analysis shows, the quality of institutions in Angola seem to suggest 
grabber friendly institutions. These findings appears to strengthen the hypothesis set forth by Mehlum 
et al. (2006ab), that resource abundance, combined with low-quality institutions, has an impact on 
economic performance, in the case of Angola. Furthermore, there are hardly any steps towards the 
direction of structural transformation, which might be linked to the economic dominance of the 
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resource sector in Angola. 
 
However, the tremendous growth that Angola has experienced up until 2009, and the improved terms of 
economic freedom, contradicts the hypothesis, as there are no signs of an improvement in the quality of 
institutions in the same time frame. Furthermore, it is crucial to question the indices and the statistics 
that rather draw a picture of grabber-friendly institutions, in spite of the GDP growth. We therefore 
seek to combine our findings from the quantitative analysis with an analysis based on qualitative 
empirical data. In this sense we hope to gain a much broader perspective in testing the robustness of the 
hypothesis, set forth by the institutional approach. 
 
5.3 Institutional quality in Angola – a qualitative analysis 
As mentioned, we now intend to analyse the institutional quality in Angola based on qualitative data. 
We will throughout this subsection regularly draw upon the quantitative analysis as we seek to discuss 
our findings in accordance with these two analytical parts. As in the quantitative analysis we will also 
in the qualitative analysis draw upon our analytical indicators, in order to determine the institutional 
quality within Angola. 
5.3.1 The indicator of business environment 
In the quantitative analysis we found the rule of law in Angola to be fairly weak. A weak rule of law 
includes weak protection of property rights, and thus weak formal rules of the game. According to 
Mehlum et al. rent seeking will pay off outside the productive economy with this type of low-quality 
institution, as production and rent seeking becomes competing activities. This will invite shady-
dealings in the business environment (Mehlum et al., 2006b:1121). Furthermore, institutions and 
property rights are closely connected to the economic performance, which can be connected to the 
business environment (Coase, 1960:2). But since property rights influence the way resources are 
allocated, we find it important to take the macro level into account, as businesses and firms influence 
this level. 
 
58 
 
Looking at our analytical indicator of the business environment, it appears as if the inefficiency of 
governance, and the lacking definition of property rights, hamper a more prosperous development in 
this area. According to the Coase theorem property rights needs to well defined within an economy, in 
order to keep transaction cost low (Furubotn & Richter 2005:47-8). In Angola this theorem becomes 
evident when looking at the “Doing Business in Angola” index, which displays how costly and time-
intense starting a new business actually is. A new entrepreneur in Angola needs money and time, since 
the costs for a start-up exceed the amount of the GNI per capita by 10 times, and the entire procedure 
can take up 10 months (World Bank, 2014 Doing Business 2015:17-19). It is especially time-
consuming to wait for a construction permit in Angola, as approximately 200 days and 10 single 
procedures are required to be granted a permit (World Bank, 2014  Doing Business 2015:24). 
 
This implies that in the case of Angola, low-quality institutions hamper the economic performance 
within the country. However, when drawing upon the Sub-Saharan Africa Regional Report on 
entrepreneurship from 2012, these findings seem to suggest a different outcome. Although inefficient 
government bureaucracy has been identified as one of the greatest challenges in terms of business 
(Herrington & Kelley, 2012:19), this does not seem to have a severe effect on the incentives for new 
entrepreneurial activities – only 38% fear failure and, as mentioned above, the overall attitude 
regarding entrepreneurship is optimistic (Herrington & Kelley, 2012:22). 
 
Although the institutional quality within Angola seem to be grabber-friendly and not producer-friendly, 
as seen in the quantitative analysis, it does not seem to restrain the motivation to start up a business in 
Angola. This could weaken the hypothesis set forth by Mehlum et al. (2006ab), as they assume 
entrepreneurs will develop incentives to engage in rent-seeking activates when having grabber-friendly 
institutions. However, this empirical data suggests that the entrepreneurs within the business 
environment in Angola have incentives to start up a business, and not necessarily specialise in 
grabbing. Although the qualitative analysis did show widespread corruption in Angola, it could be 
argued that corruption is not bad for the economic performance in a country per se, if the rents 
appropriated from this corruption, is channeled into the productive economy, and not grabbed by the 
elite. This assumption seem to be supported when looking at quantitative analysis, which showed that 
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Angola has experienced high growth and more economic freedom in the last years in spite of 
tremendous corruption. 
 
However, in regard to the above argument, Angola does display a low rate when it comes to businesses 
created out of necessity, scoring 26 % against the Sub-Saharan average of 33 % (Herrington & Kelley, 
2012:27). While this seems to suggest that the businesses in Angola are created because of the will and 
opportunism to take part in the productive part of the economy, the country score low on the 
discontinuation of businesses, and established business ownership11 (Herrington & Kelley, 2012:27). 
Both of these measures lie under the Sub-Saharan average and seems to indicate, that while corruption 
might not discourage people from thinking that they could run a business, it might be difficult to 
sustain a business over the long run once it is started up, under the formal rules of the game. 
 
Conversely, the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor states, that there is a high growth potential in Angola, 
where almost every entrepreneur taking part in their survey expected to create new jobs in the future 
(Herrington & Kelley, 2012:35). Additionally nearly half of these entrepreneurs are expected to create 
more than five jobs in the next five years, and a majority of these are already employing others (ibid.). 
This qualitative data provides a less gloomy picture than the general scores of Transparency 
International and the Heritage Foundation, making it worth to speculate on whether these statistics are a 
picture of corruption not being as pervasive or problematic as initially indicated, or if the potential 
number of entrepreneurs in Angola could be even higher. 
5.3.2 The indicator of corruption in government 
This brings us to the analytical indicator of corruption in government. As seen in the quantitative 
analysis corruption is widespread at all levels in Angola. On the Bertelsmann Transformation Index 
Angola scores 2 out of 10 on anti-corruption measures, hinting that they have weak anti-corruption 
policies, which is in line with most other observers (Transparency International, 2011:7). 
 
                                                                    
11The number of people, who have exited their business activity, and those who have an established business, that has run 
for more than 42 months. 
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However, according to Freedom House the Angolan government has taken several measures to increase 
the transparency of public funds management over the recent years (Freedom House, 2011:48). In 2010 
two laws regarding transparency were enacted, one on penalties for money laundering and a public 
probity act (Freedom House, 2011:49; Bertelsmann Foundation, 2014:31). The public probity act 
punishes misuse of public goods for private gain and bribery. At the time of its enactment a few 
members of the cabinet and legislature had to depart as a result of this act. Since its implementation 
however, neither the probity act nor the money-laundering act has been put to a serious test. As an 
example the probity act requires public officials to disclose information on assets and income once 
every two years, but according to Freedom House the dominant interpretation is that the President, Vice 
President and the President of the national assembly are 'above' this law (ibid.). 
 
Drawing upon our analytical indicators of rule of law and bureaucratic quality the legal framework 
against corruption is in general considered inadequate, although a number of institutions have legal 
mandate to combat corruption (Transparency International, 2011:7; Freedom House, 2011:49). The 
audit court of Angola is technically vested with the power to investigate any government, ministry or 
public and private company, in which a government body is a major shareholder. Theoretically 
speaking this court has the power and mandate to investigate on the country’s key player in the oil 
sector, Sonangol, although it has yet to test its grit and needs to be strengthened further in order to 
function effectively (ibid. & Transparency International, 2011:8). Furthermore as Freedom House 
points out, the independence of the court can be questioned since it is the president that points out all 
the members of the court. In this sense it represents a very weak instrument to handle the vast array of 
corruption in the country, unless president Dos Santos himself supports it actively (ibid.). A report from 
the Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa states the following: 
 
“Although institutions in Angola are weak, public anti-corruption legislation is potentially strong. 
Utilising existing legislation to lodge citizen’s complaints about alleged public corruption and violation 
of the law – coupled with appropriate political and media monitoring of these complaints – would 
elevate the issue publicly and begin to promote the rule of law,” (Ramos, 2012:2). 
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This observation indicates that a framework for effective anti-corruption structures are present, and in 
line with North (2005, 2011) it could be argued that it is the belief system of the dominant elite that 
obstructs such a transition. Following the logic of North, the institutional matrix created by the profit 
maximizing decisions of president Dos Santos and the MPLA party, imposes constraints on new 
institutions or modification of institutional structures. The creation in 2008 of 'Fundo Soberano 
Angolano', the first sovereign wealth fund of Angola, might be an example of this. Even though the 
creation of the fund was praised by the IMF, and is a well-known tool for combating the negative risks 
of an oil boom, it has experienced six years of more or less glacial progress (Ramos, 2012:33; Wright, 
2014). By the end of 2014 target returns has still not been disclosed, no major investments has taken 
place, and the son of president Dos Santos is the chairman of the fund, suggesting that the fund is 
wholly accountable to the president (Wright, 2014). 
5.3.3 The indicators of rule of law and bureaucratic quality 
If further reports on the rule of law are examined, the impression of weak formal rules, poor law 
enforcement and lacking institutional structures is being confirmed at first glance. The Bertelsmann 
Foundation reports about violations of the law by the political and economic elites of the country, the 
interconnection between the political powers and lack of a functioning judiciary on the higher levels 
(Bertelsmann Foundation, 2014:13-14). 
 
Furthermore several reports have surfaced regarding the misappropriation of oil revenues, leading 
rather tragicomically to the Presidency, Sonangol, and the Finance Ministry often being referred to as 
'the Bermuda Triangle' (Shaxson, 2009:71; De Oliveira, 2007:607). Additionally, drawing upon the 
analytical indicator of bureaucratic quality, there is evidence that governance inefficiency has 
reinforced the financial debt crisis, as for example personal rivalries and discrepancies in accounting 
and bureaucratic processes partially led to a more severe impact of the 2008 financial crisis 
(Bertelsmann Foundation, 2014:14). The political system is furthermore being categorized as 
authoritarian, although de jure democratic institutions are existing, but since the power is highly 
centralized, democratic participation and division of power is de facto hardly existing (Bertelsmann 
Foundation, 2014:14). This qualitative background information adds important value to the explanation 
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of the predominance of the elite class in the country. This seems to indicate a dysfunctional democracy, 
which is one of the characteristics of a grabber-friendly institution. 
 
Regarding the rule of law indicator, the enforcement of laws appears to be difficult and lead to 
practices, which are not very transparent. It has been reported that foreign companies have to pay a 
great amount of taxes and fees in order to operate properly (Ramos, 2012:7). These findings support the 
assumption that in Angola, institutions are rather grabber-friendly, and corruption is a necessity in order 
to succeed in the country. As emphasised by Coase (1960), when institutions are weak, transaction 
costs – the costs of using the market system – rise, which can be connected to the empirical evidence 
regarding governance inefficiency and poor rule of law. However, when studying the legal framework 
and the law enforcement within Angola, evidence has been found that there has been an effort to 
improve the judiciary. For example already in 2004, the Petroleum Activities Law and the Petroleum 
Taxation law were introduced in order to provide a better structure for the oil sector (Ramos, 2012:6). 
 
Nevertheless, several aspects have been identified as critical in the legal context: Sonangol as a state oil 
company and the state’s concessionaire can decide with which company concession contracts for 
extractive actions will be signed, but only if an official public announcement has been made. Only if 
there are no biddings after the official announcement, or if all of them are perceived as unsatisfactory, 
can Sonangol solely decide which company will receive the concession. However, as an example it has 
been reported that in a negotiation process for lucrative pre-salt and deep-water blocks, 13 companies 
participated in total, although there never was an officially pronounced bidding round. (Ramos, 2012:7) 
This case supports the aspects of corruption and inefficient bureaucracy, which in accordance to 
Mehlum et al. (2006ab), leads to difficulties in the business sector, and thus to a weaker economic 
performance. Considering the power and significance of Sonangol, it has to be taken into account that 
this concentration of power within an elite, has a political dimension as well, and displays a 
kleptocratic regime (Acemoglu et al., 2004:162). 
 
When connecting the empirical evidence to the theoretic framework, several findings can be identified: 
First, the institutions in Angola can be categorized as grabber-friendly, seeing that significant 
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challenges exists regarding corruption, bureaucratic quality and the business environment. Second, in 
accordance with the hypothesis of Mehlum et al. (2006ab), the role institutions play has to be analysed 
very carefully, since GDP growth in Angola draw a positive picture of the economic performance. 
Third, additional aspects such as politics appear to interfere. 
 
5.4 The impact of Sonangol on institutional quality 
After having analysed our four analytical indicators with a qualitative approach, we find it quite 
necessary to dedicate a subsection to Sonangol. As the oil sector is the most important sector in Angola 
it is quite important to draw a picture of this specific sector. Sonangol is the largest economic enterprise 
in Angola, and the single greatest contributor to GDP, both historically and presently (Heller, 
2012:836), and in this sense one the main economic and political players in Angola. 
 
In connection to the quantitative analysis regarding corruption it is important to emphasise what Roque 
(2011) and Shaxson (2009) refers to as the 'dual-structure' or 'dual-finance' system of the Angolan state. 
According to both Roque, Shaxson and Transparency International, the Angolan state is centered 
around President Dos Santos in a patronage system designed to co-opt and control all important actors 
that could possibly threaten the presidency (Roque, 2011; Transparency International, 2011:4). This 
system, circumscribed by the beneficiaries of the President, known as the 'Futungo', control much of 
the non-transparent financial dealings of the state (ibid.). As Shaxson (2009) elaborates: 
 
”[...]part of the state budget is managed through the conventional mechanisms involving the Treasury, the 
Ministry of Finance, and the Central Bank, whereas another part, involving oil sales outside normal budgetary 
processes, is managed by other bodies – notably by Sonangol” (Shaxson, 2009:71). 
 
This quote could imply that the government in Angola, in collaboration with Sonangol, is a kleptocratic 
regime (Acemoglu et al., 2004), as the state is controlled for the benefit of a small group, who use their 
power to grab the rents (Acemoglu et al., 2004:162). According to Roque (2011), the national oil 
company Sonangol plays a central role in this regime through corruption and the mismanagement of 
funds (Roque, 2011:2). 
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A main strategy of Sonangol has been a focus on maintaining and developing relations of trust and 
mutual obligations both between the government and 'Futungo' and the government and the 
international companies. The company has been the primary drafter and enforcer of the petroleum legal 
regime of Angola, which has provided stable mechanisms for the planning of investments and 
operations, imports of goods and equipment, sequencing of payments, conduct of audits, and the 
distribution of oil cargos (Heller, 2012:855). This structure, that Sonangol provides, is the main reason 
for why international oil companies are willing to make billion-dollar investments in Angola. These 
multinational actors, especially international oil companies from the U.S. and Europe, extract and 
produce the oil primarily through “product sharing agreements” (PSA) or joint ventures with Sonangol. 
Under a joint venture the foreign company and the government share investment costs. In the product 
sharing agreements however, the foreign company pays for the costs of exploration, and gets its 
expenditures covered by the initial profit if production is successful. The remaining 'profit oil' is split 
with Sonangol, leaving the Angolan government risk free in the initial process of exploration and 
letting it profit massively from the work of the international oil companies (Hammond, 2011:355; 
Ramos, 2012:6).  
 
In line with Coase (1960), the action of adjusting contractual agreements like the PSA implementation 
can be perceived as a way to adjust property rights. This would consequently reduce the transaction 
costs and make the use of the market system more profitable. Although companies that want to operate 
in Angola have to sign a co-operative agreement with Sonangol, theoretically in economic terms, this 
framework leads to greater advantages, vis-a-vis the Coase theorem. 
 
To win contracts for extraction and production, multinational companies must pay signature bonuses, 
and in 2006 this amounted to more than $1 billion, which attributed to the stable and reliable role of 
Sonangol, as well as the promising geology of Angola (Heller, 2012:856). An important thing to 
emphasise though is that by no means are Sonangol a commercial company, as the interests of 
Sonangol are quite different from those of its investors. According to Heller (2012) the company is 
interested in protecting the lifespan of its oil production, and is therefore striving to keep the balance 
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between maximizing government revenue, without undercutting the incentives for outsiders to invest 
(ibid.). Officials from several International Oil Companies report that Sonangol is one of the toughest 
partners of the developing world oil-states, especially when it comes to negotiation and monitoring of 
operating contracts. It is not unusual for Sonangol to reject operating group proposals, on grounds of 
the pace of extraction that could threaten total production potential (ibid.). It has also been noted to 
deliberately slow or block operational developments by delaying approvals or sending contradictory 
signals (ibid.). Despite of this incidences of corruption in relation to foreign investors is low, and 
officials from international oil companies generally describe Sonangol as having an excellent track 
record and reputation (Heller, 2012; De Oliveira, 2007:605).  
 
In connection to North (2005, 2011), this indicates that when dealing with foreign companies willing to 
invest in the oil sector, formal rules that are seemingly badly enforced in the non-oil economy, such as 
contract enforcement, are stronger in this particular sector. Furthermore this could also indicate, that 
operating contracts in the oil sector is an area where productive activities outweigh rent-seeking, as 
badly defined rules of oil extraction could lead to international oil companies exploiting potential vague 
rules for their own benefit, decreasing the profit of the Angolan state. 
 
In relation to this, Sonangol insists on a local content policy, directing outside investors to funnel 
contracts into a vast network of affiliates and private companies, in order to create an indigenous 
private sector. Through this the Angolan government is trying to use the oil industry to create access to 
capital in order to develop a strong entrepreneurial base in the non-oil sector. These jobs and contracts 
are extremely lucrative, but paradoxically, as transparent and competitive that Sonangol is, when 
selecting international partners, as opaque are they in selecting companies to work with domestically. 
Consequently almost only individuals with personal ties to the elite are given the benefits of access to 
the industry, helping to make the private sector of Angola small and exclusive, and thus retarding the 
initial government policy of enhancing the non-oil sectors (Heller, 2012:861). This should also be seen 
in the light of the quantitative analysis of structural transformation presented earlier in this analysis, 
where the majority of work force is located in the agricultural sector. Following North (2005, 2011), the 
corruption and nepotism illustrated above should have huge consequences for economic performance, 
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since there is no incentives for entrepreneurs without elite ties to compete for these contracts. Given 
that entrepreneurs are profit maximizing as North and Mehlum et al state, the way Sonangol chooses 
domestic companies to work with, makes it more profitable for entrepreneurs in Angola to create good 
personal ties with government elites, rather than engaging in productive activities. This is 
because competence might not be the main basis of contract selection, which lessens incentives for 
productive activities.  
 
This impact on the institutional quality by Sonangol does seem to imply that the elite in Angola is 
capturing all the resource rents, and profit, from the extraction of resources. Combined with the 
kleptocratic regime, these formal and informal rules offer scarce prospects for long-term growth. This 
is at least the argument put forward by Acemoglu et al., as it becomes a problem for economic 
development in a country if a narrow elite benefits from state rules and regulations, instead of power 
being based on a broad scale (Acemoglu et al., 2002:1262). As argued in the analytical indicator of rule 
of law in the quantitative analysis (page 49), the political system in Angola is authoritarian, as the 
power is highly centralized and division of power is hardly existing (Bertelsmann Foundation, 
2014:14). This implies extractive institutions (Acemoglu et al., 2002) or grabber-friendly institutions 
(Mehlum et al., 2006ab) within Angola. If production should pay off for an entrepreneur it is crucial, 
that those who pursue productive activities within an economy must receive a return on investment, as 
many of the entrepreneurs, with investment opportunities, may very well be those without effective 
property rights (Acemoglu et al., 2002:1263). If the informal rules governing the rules of the game 
favour those with elite ties, this may hamper incentives to engage in productive activities, rather than 
rent-seeking activities.  
 
Drawing upon North this will furthermore decrease the possibility of institutional change in Angola, as 
profit maximising and pay-off is the main incentive for the entrepreneur (North, 2005:23). 
Although that being said, the many subsidiaries of Sonangol do provide a glimpse of how the non-oil 
sector might benefit from the success of Sonangol, and that the economic growth in the oil sector might 
influence the private sector, thus have an effect on the incentive to start a business. So far this has 
resulted in between 30 and 60 different ventures including a drilling company, a packaging and storing 
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company, a service provider company for the oil industry, a manufacturer of pipelines and underwater 
production systems for oil and gas, a bank, hotel management and ownership, and construction of 
luxury housing, as well as education scholarships (De Oliveira, 2007:604). 
 
5.5 Sub conclusion on the qualitative analysis 
In terms of economic performance from 2006-2013 Angola has experienced tremendous growth rates, 
however, the country has only experienced little change regarding structural transformation, although 
having much opportunity to develop in this area. In determining the institutional quality of Angola, 
based on quantitative data, it became evident that the hypothesis by Mehlum et al. (2006ab) was robust 
on all four analytical indicators. The analysis found a weak rule of law, low bureaucratic quality, high 
levels of corruption and a weak business environment, where property rights were not very well 
defined. Both informal and formal rules of the game seemed to suggest grabber-friendly institutions 
within Angola, thus strengthening the hypothesis that oil abundance results in poor economic 
performance, when having low quality institutions. 
 
The same picture became evident when applying qualitative data, although a much more blurry picture. 
The analytical indicator of the business environment seems to imply grabber-friendly institutions, 
although many entrepreneurs within Angola were not discouraged to start up a new business. This 
finding appears to weaken the hypothesis of Mehlum et al. (2006ab), as it is assumed that entrepreneurs 
will engage in rent-seeking activities, when having low-quality institutions. Turning to the indicator of 
corruption, the analysis found it to be widespread and endemic, although the Angolan government has 
pursued many anti-corruption measures. However, these measures have not been well implemented, as 
some informal rules were seen to govern the rules of the game in a manner that has lead the elite to 
obstruct the process of transparency. Concerning the analytical indicators of rule of law and 
bureaucratic quality, the analysis found formal rules to be weak, poor law enforcement and a 
dysfunctional democracy. This finding was further enhanced as power was found to be centralized to 
the elite and the national oil company Sonangol.  
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Concerning Sonangol the analysis found that the national-state-owned company has a great impact on 
the institutional quality within Angola. Instead of seeking to create entrepreneurship in the non-oil 
economy, as Heller (2012) emphasises, according to De Oliveira (2007) and Transparency International 
the many joint-ventures of Sonangol and the subsequent money flows results in a 'down streaming of 
corruption', and increases the likelihood of embezzlement of public funds severely. This is attributed to 
the rent allocation of the presidency, aimed at sharing the spoils of oil in order to stay in office, 
resulting in a lack of openness and competitiveness in the Angolan economy (De Oliveira 2007: 608; 
Transparency International, 2011:6). 
 
In this sense the analysis seems to suggest that the categorization of grabber-friendly institutions by 
Mehlum et al. (2006ab) can be applied without further doubt. However, the findings of the current 
economic performance in Angola seem to contradict the hypothesis set forth by the institutional 
approach, as Angola has experienced tremendous growth within our time frame. According to Mehlum 
et al. (2006ab) a grabber-friendly institution would hamper the growth rates and the business 
environment. Furthermore, the industrial sector has the biggest share of the GDP, which is indicating 
that this sector has developed in comparison to the past. This contradicts the hypothesis by Mehlum et 
al. (2006ab), leading us to critically assess our own conclusions, considering which other components 
might be interfering with the economic performance in Angola. 
 
5.6 Analytical discussion 
In this chapter we seek to discuss the outcome of our analysis in order to fully answer our problem 
formulation: 
 
To what extent and how does the quality of institutions determine whether natural resource abundance 
has a negative or positive impact on economic performance in the case of Angola? 
 
Our analysis has shown that Angola indeed does have low-quality institutions, and thus grabber-
friendly, based on an institutional theoretical framework. Combining quantitative and qualitative data 
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on Angola, the hypothesis by Mehlum et al. (2006ab) does seem to be strengthened, when analysed 
accordingly with our theoretical framework. However, the hypothesis appear to be contradicted in some 
areas within our analysis, leading us to reconsider the causality of our hypothesis, but also other 
omitted variables, that may not have been taken into account. Even though the analysis shows, that 
Angola holds grabber-friendly institutions, the analytical indicator of the business environment 
emphasised, that entrepreneurs within Angola did not find themselves discouraged to start a business. 
Thus, grabber-friendly institutions did not seem to hamper their motivation to engage in productive 
activities. Moreover, the analytical indicator of corruption did show widespread corruption within 
Angola, and also within the business environment in general. However, the growth, which Angola has 
experienced within our time frame, does seem to suggest, that corruption may not hamper growth as 
much as indicated by Mehlum et al. (2006ab). 
 
We therefore seek to discuss other aspects of the link regarding oil abundance and the resource curse, 
which may be affected by low quality institutions, but may also be affected by other variables and 
factors not taken into account. 
 
5.6.1 Political foundations of the resource curse 
As mentioned in the chapter on complementary theoretical views (page 27), Mehlum et al. (2006ab) 
does state that there may be additional reasons for why institutions are key to understanding the 
resource curse, pointing to the patronage model by Robinson et al. (2006). The institutional approach 
set forth by Mehlum et al. (2006ab) does seem to lack some explanatory power in the case of Angola, 
as the political factor is not accounted for. This political factor may be an additional factor in 
explaining how and to what extent resource abundance and low-quality institutions can be linked to a 
resource curse. 
 
The patronage model is a political model for resource extraction, which takes political incentives into 
account. Policy mistakes will, according to their model, be rational political strategies, as politicians 
tend to respond to the incentives induced by resource rents (Robinson et al., 2006:448). Robinson et al. 
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argue, that political incentives, generated by natural resources, are key to understanding how they 
influence the development path of the country (Robinson et al., 2006:466). Resource booms tend to 
create inefficiency in the rest of the economy, as it encourages politicians to engage in inefficient 
distribution to influence elections (in democratic regimes), and political contests (in non-democratic 
regimes) (Robinson et al., 2006:461). The extent to which these political incentives could lead to a 
resource curse12, depends on the quality of institutions. 
 
In this sense, it could have strengthened the explanatory ability of our hypothesis to include political 
incentives, as the case of Angola show, that power is highly centralized within a small elite of the 
country, with special regard to president Dos Santos. As Sonangol both engage in the political and 
economic decisions within the country, a theoretical focus on the incentives of Sonangol would have 
contributed to the explanatory power. Especially concerning the allocation of local content contracts, as 
the chapter: ‘the impact of Sonangol on institutional quality’ (page 70) showed, the winners are almost 
exclusively those who have personal ties to the elite. As De Oliveira (2007) further qualifies, this 
creates a downward allocation of corruption from Sonangol, and it might be this factor that creates 
inefficiency in other areas than the oil sector (Source). However this is not tantamount to a non-corrupt 
Sonangol, as they still play central role in mismanaging funds (Roque, 2011). 
 
Building upon the political factors, Acemoglu et al. (2004) also stress that kleptocratic regimes has 
weak institutions, and that politicians tend to punish the society if they fail to support the regime. In our 
analysis we found that the political system in Angola is authoritarian, as the power is highly 
centralized, and the division of power is hardly existing (Bertelsmann Foundation, 2014:14). This 
implies extractive institutions (Acemoglu et al., 2002) or grabber-friendly institutions (Mehlum et al. 
2006ab) within Angola. According to Niño & Le Billon (2014), the centralized institutional 
arrangement that manages the oil rents in Angola, is a good match for a centralized political regime 
with scarce and concentrated technical ability (Niño & Le Billon, 2014:91).  
 
                                                                    
12Resource curse is by these scholars defined as a situation where a resource boom leads to lower GDP 
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According to our findings it could be argued that the weak formal and informal institutional quality of 
Angola is beneficial for the political elite of the state, maximizing the profit of oil rents, as shown by 
Niño & Le Billon. Due to the concentration of power, the elite can easily benefit from the existing 
corruption. They further find Angola: 
 
”...deriving revenue both through taxes and profits, imposing higher production taxes on IOC's 
[International Oil Companies edt] and pushing for Angolanizacao, a more stringent local beneficiation 
and skills acquisition regime. On the back of this strategy, the Angolan NOC [National Oil Company 
edt.] has acquired global standing and oil rents have funded the state, despite legitimate doubts about the 
capacity and willingness of the regime to transfer capacity to nonoil private and public sectors” (Niño & 
Le Billon, 2013:22). 
 
Considering the logic of Mehlum et al. (2006ab) and their hypothesis this means that political factors, 
such as political incentives, could have a better explanatory power in the case of Angola, or at least 
worked as an additional factor considering the effect of political incentive.  
 
5.6.2 Theory versus reality 
These political factors all seem to support, and somehow supplement, the hypothesis of Mehlum et al. 
(2006) by taking other factors into account, that ultimately favours the same outcome. However, one 
could also question the theoretical framework, which the hypothesis is based upon. 
 
As shown in our analysis, even though the Angolan business environment is subject to corruption, ill-
defined property rights and a weak rule of law, there seem to be both strong potential and optimism 
among Angolan entrepreneurs. This could indicate that institutions, and especially the analytical 
indicators we have used to measure the quality of institutions, may not be accurate in the case of 
Angola. Well-defined property rights may, according to the Coase-theorem, be important for 
entrepreneurs in Angola, but in reality the entrepreneurs do not appear to lose the incentive to start up a 
business. At the same time it must be considered, that the greatest sector within Angola, besides the oil-
sector, is agriculture. In this sense it could be questioned how much better off the business environment 
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would be, if property rights were better defined. This brings out the discrepancies between theory and 
reality, as this may be a problem in theory, but not in reality in the case of Angola. 
 
In addition, our analysis may find that Angola has grabber-friendly institutions, but this outcome does 
not necessarily lead to poor economic performance. It depends on many factors, such as how the 
resource rents are invested, whether these rents are channelled into the productive economy, or grabbed 
by a small elite. The tremendous growth in Angola does seem to suggest, that the grabber-friendly 
institutions has not necessarily led to poor economic performance, especially when solely focussing on 
the GDP growth rates.  
 
In the case of Angola, it can certainly be debated how and to which degree Sonangol is corrupt, as 
evidenced by both Heller (2011) and De Oliveira (2007). However, the company has performed 
effectively and are contributing immensely to creating growth rates in Angola. Therefore, it seems fair 
to say that corruption in the oil extraction sector does not seem to be a major problem for economic 
growth in Angola, even though it can always be speculated whether or not growth would have been 
even better, if corruption were no issue at all. Furthermore, Di John states that there is no clear 
evidence that corruption is worse in mineral and fuel abundant countries, than in non-abundant ones 
(Di John, 2011:173). If this is the case then it is peculiar how a country such as China, which for 
instance does not have well defined property rights, and struggle with corruption, has experienced 
tremendous growth rates over a long period of time (Freedom House, 2013 Freedom in the World: 
China). If corruption might not be such a hindrance to economic performance, this could open up a 
debate as to whether transparency is a necessary 'rule of the game' in relation to economic performance.  
 
Nevertheless, the effect on economic performance can be seen as ambivalent. As 85% of the citizens 
still work in the agricultural sector, which only makes 10% of the GDP, it shows that there has not been 
significant efforts towards diversification or deepening of the economy. Additionally, the lacking 
development of industrial sector beyond the oil industry, can be interpreted as evidence for weak 
transformation over time.  
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Moreover, especially in accordance to the identified drivers for structural transformation, government 
inefficiency is one of the determinants for bad economic performance, and since Angolan bureaucratic 
quality is weak, this can explain the slow structural transformation.  
 
5.6.3 Omitted variables 
This leads us to consider not only additional factors within the causality, but also to consider possible 
omitted variables, that have not been taken into account in our analysis. A possible factor that could 
have influenced our causality is that of education and skills. As argued in our quantitative analysis the 
data on education shows, that there is a chance for improvement in Angola. While in 2013 adults, older 
than 25 years, had on average only slightly less than 5 years of schooling in their youth, children, who 
entered the educational system in 2013, had an approximate schooling time of over 10 years (UNDP, 
2013:2). This would lead to more skills and capabilities, in other words human resources, which could 
be a trigger for an improvement of the economic performance. Not only is this an omitted variable we 
have not accounted for, when talking about economic performance in Angola, but it also serve as a 
possibility to pursue structural transformation in the country. The level of economic growth, and the 
slight changes in the primary sectors, could be perceived as an indicator of possible structural 
transformation.  
 
In this way our analysis could depict the problem of path-dependency, as emphasised by North (2005, 
2011). It can be difficult to change existing economic structures, and especially informal rules are 
difficult to change, such as taking bribery in the business environment. This puts the argument by 
Acemoglu et al. (2002) into perspective, as they emphasise the importance of the colonial legacy and 
narrow elite regimes. 
 
When combining this view with the view of De Oliveira (2007) and Ferreira's (2006) analysis of the 
colonial period, an argument can be made, that Angola has a long history of bad quality institutions, 
and that natural resources has nothing directly to do with this. For example, because the Portuguese 
colonialists ventured beyond the coastal trading ports of Luanda and Benguela much later in the 
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colonization period, parts of mainland Angola was first incorporated into the colonial structures 
centuries later, resulting in a bifurcation of the country that has lasted until present day (De Oliveira, 
2013:167). 
 
This entails that what is defined as good quality institutions, such as property rights and rule of law, has 
historically been much less widespread and implemented in mainland Angola, than in the coastal areas. 
This goes to say, that what Mehlum et al. (2006ab) defines as quality institutions, may never have been 
widespread or effective in Angola, and therefore have not been worsened by natural resource 
abundance. To the contrary, it may be more so that resource abundance simply has not made 
institutions better, but has increased GDP, which can be misunderstood without knowing the historical 
background. 
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6.0 Conclusion 
In this section, we would like to outline our final conclusions and findings in this paper. While doing 
so, we have sought to answer our problem formulation:  
 
To what extent and how does the quality of institutions determine whether natural resource abundance 
has a negative or positive impact on economic performance in the case of Angola? 
 
In order to answer our problem formulation we have tried to test the robustness of the hypothesis set 
forth by Mehlum et al. (2006ab). In this sense we have tried to test the influence of institutions on the 
link between resource abundance and economic performance, in the case of Angola. The economic 
performance of Angola was found to be rather positive within the specific time frame of 2006-2013. 
Not only has Angola experienced tremendous growth rates, but it also became evident that Angola 
holds possibilities for structural transformation, since their agricultural sector employs the wide 
majority of the people, meaning there is potential for upgrading and diversification towards an 
extended manufacturing sector.  
 
In order to arrive at a suitable conclusion to our findings, this paper has outlined four analytical 
indicators in determining the institutional quality in Angola. These indicators are: rule of law, 
bureaucratic quality, corruption in government and the business environment. By applying these 
indicators on the case of Angola, based on both quantitative and qualitative data, we have arrived at 
several interesting findings. 
 
From the quantitative analysis we saw Angola performing weak on all four indicators, which 
characterized both the formal and informal rules of the game. Angola scored low on the formal rules of 
the game concerning rule of law and bureaucratic efficiency, as both institutions were found to be 
weak. The informal rules of the game concerning corruption in government were likewise found to be 
widespread at all levels. The analytical indicator of the business environment furthermore showed that 
the formal rules of the game such as property rights were ill-defined, while the informal rules and 
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norms showed a down streaming of corruption. By applying qualitative data this picture was further 
enhanced. The rule of law indicator showed that Angola was influenced by a kleptocratic regime, where 
the elite had centralized power, while applying corruptive measures. The analysis furthermore showed 
that the national oil company Sonangol heavily influenced the institutional quality of Angola towards 
inefficiency and lacking transparency. However, despite widespread corruption, the indicator of the 
business environment did seem to suggest, that entrepreneurs were not discouraged to start up a 
business. Moreover, the indicator of corruption in government showed that several anti-corruption 
measures had been implemented, although these measures had yet to test their grit.    
 
All of these findings seemed to support and strengthen the hypothesis set forth by Mehlum et al. 
(2006ab), as we could conclude, that Angola did hold low-quality institutions on all four indicators, 
indicating grabber-friendly institutions. However, according to Mehlum et al. (2006ab) a grabber-
friendly institution would hamper the growth rates and the business environment. Furthermore, the 
industrial sector has the biggest share of GDP, which is indicating that this sector has developed in 
comparison to the past. This contradicts the causality put forward by Mehlum et al. (2006ab), as 
Angola is resource abundant, holds low-quality institutions, but does not necessarily display a poor 
economic performance. 
 
These contradictions led us to discuss whether there are other important factors or omitted variables to 
consider, which has not been taken into account in the hypothesis. From Robinson et al. (2006) and 
Acemoglu et al. (2004) we saw that political explanations could be a key add-on to the hypothesis of 
Mehlum et al (2006ab). Political incentives, generated by natural resources, could be an additional 
factor to understand, why institutions are key to understanding the resource curse. Furthermore, the 
analytical indicators could also be questioned, as they might not be relevant in determining the quality 
of institutions in the specific case of Angola. A high level of corruption in Angola did not necessarily 
play out in terms of poor economic performance. In this sense, what seems to be a problem in theory 
may not be a problem in reality. Last but not least, we had to consider omitted variables, such as 
education and human resources, which may also influence the causality of this hypothesis.  
 
77 
 
Along these lines we saw that history could be an important variable as well. It can be argued that 
Angola has a history of bad quality institutions, and that natural resource abundance has not necessarily 
had a worsening effect on these, but has led to improvements in growth, which can be easily 
misunderstood, when investigating a short time period. 
 
From all of the above findings we argue, that the even though Angola has grabber-friendly institutions, 
we have not been able to confirm the link between resource abundance and an economic performance, 
when having low quality institutions in the case of Angola. Following the logic of Mehlum et al. 
(2006ab), grabber-friendly institutions would lead to a displacement effect, thus a resource curse, when 
having resource abundance. However, this analysis has found that even though Angola does seem to 
have grabber-friendly institutions on all the analytical indicators, this does not imply a negative impact 
on the economic performance in Angola. Conversely, we see slight positive changes in the economy, 
such as economic growth and small steps towards structural transformation, which challenges the role 
of institutions in the context of economic performance. Combined with the possibilities for developing 
structural transformation, this may imply that the hypothesis by Mehlum et al. (2006ab) is not so robust 
after all, in the case of Angola, since our findings shows that institutional quality solely does not 
determine economic performance.  
 
  
78 
 
Bibliography 
• Acemoglu, D. & Johnson, S. & Robinson, J.A. (2002) ‘Reversal of Fortune’: Geography and 
Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution”, The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 117 (4), 1231 – 1294 
• Acemoglu, D. & Robinson, J.A. & Verdier, T. (2004) Kleptocracy and Divide-And-Rule a 
Model of Personal Rule, Journal of the European Economic Association, 2(2-3), 162-192 
• African Development Bank (2014) Size of the shadow economy and easy of doing business 
Available at http://angola.opendataforafrica.org/iijtaxf/size-of-shadow-economy-and-ease-of-
doing-business [seen 10/10/14] 
• African Economic Outlook (2013) Taking Stock on Africa’s Structural Transformation 
Available at http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/theme/structural-transformation-and-
natural-resources/taking-stock-of-africa%E2%80%99s-structural-transformation/ [seen 
12/11/14] 
• The African Report (2014) Angola's economy grows, but what about the poor? 
Available at http://www.theafricareport.com/Southern-Africa/angolas-economy-grows-but-
what-about-the-poor.html [seen 11/12/14] 
• Ankersborg, V. (2007) Kildekritik i et samfundsvidenskabeligt perspektiv, 1. Udgave, Forlaget 
Samfundslitteratur 
• Arrow, K. (1969) The organization of economic activity: issues pertinent to the choice of 
market versus nonmarket allocation, The Analysis and Evaluation of Public expenditures: the 
PBB System, Joint Economic Committee Compendium, 91st Congress, 1st Section, Vol. 1.  
• Auty, R. M. (2001) Resource abundance and economic development, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
• Bakwena, M. & Bodman, P. & Le, T.Q. & Tang, K.K (2009) Avoiding the Resource Curse: 
The Role of Institutions, School of Economics, The University of Queensland 
• Bertelsmann Foundation (2014) BTI 2014 — Angola Country Report. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann 
79 
 
Stiftung 
Available at http://www.bti-project.org/uploads/tx_itao_download/BTI_2014_Angola.pdf [seen 
05/12/14] 
• Broschini, A.D. & Pettersson, J. & Roine, J. (2007) Resource Curse or Not: A Question of 
Appropriability, Scand. J. of Economics, 109(3), 593-617 
• Brunnschweiler, C.N. & Bulte, E.H. (2008) The resource curse revisited and revised: A tale of 
paradoxes and red herrings, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 55, pp. 
248-264 
• Bryman, A. (2012) Social research methods, 4th edition, Oxford University 
• Bulte, E.H. & Damania, R. & Deacon, R.T. (2005) Resource Intensity, Institutions, and 
Development. World Development, 33 (7), 1029-1044 
 
• Carmignani, F. & Chowdhury, A. (2010) Why are natural resources a curse in Africa, but not 
elsewhere? School of economics, The University of Queensland Brisbane 
• Coase, R.H. (1960) The Problem of Social Cost, Journal of Law and Economics, 3, 1-44 
• Collier, P. & Hoeffler, A. (1998) On Economic Causes of Civil War, Oxford Economic Papers, 
50(4), pp. 563-573  
• Cotet, A.M. & Tsui, K.K. (2009) Resource Curse or Malthusian Trap? Evidence from Oil 
Discoveries and Extractions, Ball State University and Clemson University  
 
• Di John, J. (2011) Is There Really a Resource Curse? A Critical Survey of Theory and 
Evidence, Global Governance, 17(2) 
• De Oliveria, R.S. (2007) Business success – Angola-style: postcolonial politics and the rise and 
rise of Sonangol, Modern African Studies, 45 (4), pp. 595-619  
• De Oliveira, R.S. (2013) O Governo Está Aqui: Post-war State-making in the Angolan 
Periphery, Politique Africaine, 130 (2), 165-187 
 
80 
 
• Ferreira, M.E. (2006) Angola: Conflict and development, 1961 - 2002, The Economics of Peace 
and Security Journal, 1(1), 24-28. 
• Flyvbjerg, B. (2012) Fem misforståelser om casestudiet. In Kvalitative metode. Written by 
Brichmann, S. & Tangaard, L. Published by Hans Reitzels Forlag. Latvia 
• Foreign Policy (2013), Corrupting Perceptions 
Available at http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/07/22/corrupting-perceptions/  [seen 28/11/14] 
• Freedom House (2013) Freedom in the World 2013: China  
Available at https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2013/china#.VIyXzyuG_d1 [seen 
13/12/14] 
• Freedom House (2011) Countries at the Crossroads 2011 Methodology Questions, Freedom 
House. Available on http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNAEA397.pdf 
• Freedom House (2014a) Freedom in the World: Angola 
Available at https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2014/angola-0#.VIhx5XuwX8g 
[seen 09/12/14] 
• Furubotn, E.G. & Pejovich, S. (1972) Property Rights and Economic Theory: a survey of recent 
literature, Journal of Economic Literature 10(4), 1137-1162.  
• Furubotn, E.G. & Richter, R. (2005) Institutions and Economic Theory. The contribution of the 
New Institutional Economics. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.  
• Fund for Peace (2013) Failed States States Index 2013 
Available at http://ffp.statesindex.org/rankings-2013-sortable [seen 02/12/14] 
• Fund for Peace (2014) Methodology 
Available at http://ffp.statesindex.org/methodology [seen 04/12/14] 
 
• Gylfason, T. & Zoega, G. (2001) Natural resources and economic growth: the role of 
investment, University of Iceland  
 
• Hammond, J.L. (2011) The Resource Curse and Oil Revenues in Angola and Venezuela, 
Science & Society, 75(3), 348–378 
81 
 
• Heller, P. (2012) Angola's Sonangol: Dexterous right hand of the state, David, V.G. & Hults, D.
R.& Thurber, M.C (eds) in Oil and Governance: State-Owned Enterprises and the World Energ
y Supply, Cambridge University Press 
• Heritage Foundation, 2014 Index of Economic Freedom: Methodology  
Available at http://www.heritage.org/index/book/methodology [seen 15/11/14] 
• Heritage Foundation (2014b) 2014 Index of Economic Freedom, Graph the Data 
Available at http://www.heritage.org/index/visualize [seen 02/12/14] 
• Heritage Foundation, About Heritage 
Available at http://www.heritage.org/about [seen 16/12/14] 
• Herrington, M. & Kelley, D. (2012) African Entrepreneurship: Sub-Saharan Africa Regional 
Report 2012, Global Entrepreneurship Monitor,  
Available at http://www.gemconsortium.org/docs/download/3207  [seen 17/11/14] 
• Hodges, T. (2004) Angola: Anatomy of an Oil State, Bloomington and Indianapolis, Indiana 
University Press  
 
• IMF (2012), Angola, IMF Country Report No. 12/215, 
Available at: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2012/cr12215.pdf 
• IMF (2014) Angola, IMF Country Report No. 14/275,  
Available at: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2014/cr14275.pdf 
 
• Jick, T.D. (1979) Mixing Qualitative and Quantitative Methods: Triangulation in Action, Corne
ll University, 24 
 
• Kaplinsky, R. & Morris, M. & Kaplan, D. (2012) One Thing Leads to Another - Promoting 
industrialisation by making the most of the commodity boom in Sub-Saharan Africa  
• Kaufmann, D. & Mastruzzi, M. & Kraay, A. (2009) Governance Matters 2009 – Worldwide 
Governance Indicators 1996-2008, World Bank Institute  
Available at http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/pdf/WBI_GovInd.pdf 
82 
 
• Kaufmann, D. & Kraay, A. & Mastruzzi, M. (2010) The World Wide Governance Indicators: 
Methodology and Analytical Issues, Global Economy and Development at Brookings   
• Kolstad, I. (2007) The Resource Curse Which Institutions Matter? Chr. Michelsen Institute, 
Working Paper:2  
 
• Lundgren, C. J. & Thomas, A.H. & York, R.C. (2013) Boom, Bust, or Prosperity? Managing 
Sub-Saharan Africa’s Natural Resource Wealth, International Monetary Fund 
• Lyngaard, Kenneth (2012) Dokumentanalyse. In Kvalitative metoder. Written by Brinkmann, S. 
& Tangaard, L. Published by Hans Reitzels Forlag, Latvia 
 
• Mehlum, H. & Moene, C. & Torvik, R. (2006a) Cursed by Resources or Institutions?, World 
Economy, 29: 1117–1131 
• Mehlum, H. & Moene, C. & Torvik, R. (2006b) Institutions and the Resource Curse, The 
Economic Journal, 116: 1–20. 
• Menard, C. & Shirley, M.M. (2005) What is New Institutional Economics, p. 1-18, in Menard, 
C. & Shirley, M.M. (eds) Handbook of New Institutional Economics, Springer, The Netherlands 
• Miller, T. & Kim, A.B. & Holmes, K.R & Roberts, J.M. & Riley, B. & Olson, R. (2014) 2014 
Index of Economic Freedom, Heritage Foundation 
Available at http://www.heritage.org/index/pdf/2014/book/index_2014.pdf [seen 09/12/14] 
• Murshed, S.M (2004) When Does Natural Resource Abundance lead to a Resource Curse? 
Environmental Economics Programme 
• Muzima, J. & Mazivila, D. (2014) Angola, The African Economic Outlook 
Available at: 
http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/fileadmin/uploads/aeo/2014/PDF/CN_Long_EN/Angol
a_ENG.pdf  [seen 06/11/14] 
 
• Niño, H.P. & Le Billon, P. (2013) Foreign Aid, Resource Rents, and State Fragility in 
Mozambique and Angola, WIDER Working Paper 2013/102  
83 
 
• Niño, H.P. & Le Billon, P. (2014) Foreign Aid, Resource Rents, and State Fragility in 
Mozambique and Angola, The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Science, 656 – 79 
• North, D.C. & Thomas, R.P. (1973) The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History. 
New York: Cambridge University Press 
• North, D. (2005) Institutions and the Performance of Economies Over Time, p. 21 – 30, in 
Menard, C. & Shirley, M.M. (eds) Handbook of New Institutional Economics, Springer, The 
Netherlands 
• North, D. (2011) Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, New York, 
Cambridge University Press 
 
• Polterovich, V. & Popov, V. & Tonis, A. (2010) Resource Abundance: A Curse or Blessing, 
Economic and Social Affairs, DESA Working Paper no. 93   
 
• Ramos, M.L. (2012) Angola’s Oil Industry Operations, Open Society Initiative for Southern 
Africa publication 
• Robinson, J.A., Torvik, R., Verdier, T. (2006) Political Foundations of the Resource Curse, 
Journal of Development Economics, 79, 447-468 
• Ross, M.L. (2001) Does oil Hinder Democracy? World Politics, 53(3), pp. 325-361 
• Ross, M.L. (2014) What Have we Learned about the Resource Curse?  
Available on: http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/ross/Ross%20-
%20What%20have%20we%20learned%20about%20the%20resource%20curse.pdf [seen 
20/10/14] 
• Rosser, A. (2006) The Political Economy of the Resource Curse: A Literature Survey. Institute 
of Development Studies 
• Roque, P.C. (2011) Angola, Parallel Governments, Oil and Neopatrimonial System 
Reproduction, Institute For Security Studies, Pretoria South Africa 
• Roque, P.C. (2013) Angola's Second Post War Elections: The Alchemy of Change, Institute for 
84 
 
Security Studies, Pretoria South Africa  
 
• Saad-Filho, A. & Weeks, J. (2013) Curses, Diseases and Other Resource Confusions. Third 
World Quarterly, 34(1), 1-21 
• Sachs, J.D. & Warner, A.M. (1995) Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth, 
National Bureau of Economic Research 
• Saitsana, M. & Saltelli, A. (2012) Corruption Perceptions Index 2012, Statistical Asssesment, 
JRC Scientific and Policy Reports, European Commission.  
Available at http://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/in_detail#myAnchor4  
• Shaxson, Nicholas (2009) Angolas Homegrown Answers to the Resource Curse, p 51 – 102, in 
Governance of Oil in Africa, Paris, The Institute Francais des Relations Internationale (IFRI). 
• Singer, H.W. (1950) The Distribution of Gains between Investing and Borrowing Countries, 
The American Economic Review 
• Spruyt, H. (2013) ‘New Institutionalism and International Relations’, in Palan, R. 2013: Global 
Political Economy, contemporary theories, second edition, Routledge, UK 
 
• The Economist, the Halo Effect 
Available at http://www.economist.com/node/14299211 [seen 15/12/14] 
• Trading Economics, Angola – BNP – Vækst – 2014 
Available at http://da.tradingeconomics.com/angola/gdp-growth, [seen 16/11/14] 
• Trading Economics, Consumer Sentiment 
Available at www.da.tradingeconomics.com [seen 07/12/14] 
• Trading Economics (2014), Employment in industry (% of total employment) in Angola 
Available at http://www.tradingeconomics.com/angola/employment-in-industry-percent-of-
total-employment-wb-data.html [seen 09/11/14] 
• Trading Economics (2014), Angola GDP 
Available at http://www.tradingeconomics.com/angola/gdp [seen 01/12/14] 
• Trading Economics (2014), Angola GDP Growth Rate 
85 
 
Available at http://www.tradingeconomics.com/angola/gdp-growth [seen 11/11/14] 
• Transparency International (2011) Overview of Corruption and Anti-corruption in Angola, Anti-
Corruption Resource Center. 
Available at http://www.u4.no/publications/overview-of-corruption-and-anti-corruption-in-
angola/  [seen 25/11/14] 
• Transparency International (2013) Corruption Perception Index 2013  
Available at http://www.transparency.org/cpi2013/results [seen 08/12/14] 
• Transparency International (2014) Corruption Perception Index 2014: Results 
Available at http://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/results [seen 01/12/14] 
• Transparency International (2014) Corruption Perception Index 2014: In Detail 
Available at http://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/in_detail [seen 27/11/14] 
• Transparency International (2014), Corruption by Country: Angola 
Available at http://www.transparency.org/country#AGO  [seen 01/12/14] 
 
• UNDP, United Nations Development Programme (2013) Human Development Report 2013. 
The Rise of the South: Human Progress in a Diverse World, UNDP 
Available at http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/Country-Profiles/AGO.pdf 
• U.S. Energy Information Administration (2014) Angola Background  
Available on http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=AO [seen 05/12/14] 
 
 
• Vines, A. & Shawson, N. & Rimli, L. & Heymans, C. (2005) Angola, Drivers of Change: An 
Overview, DFID 
Available at  http://www.gsdrc.org/docs/open/DOC87.pdf [seen 10/12/14] 
 
• World Bank (2014) About: What we Do 
Available at http://www.worldbank.org/en/about/what-we-do [seen 10/11/14] 
• World Bank, Economy and Growth 
86 
 
Available at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.AGR.TOTL.ZS 
• World Bank, Strength of Legal Rights Index Available at 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IC.LGL.CRED.XQ/countries 
• World Bank (2011) Oil Rents (% of GDP) 
Available on: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PETR.RT.ZS [seen 14/11/14] 
• World Bank (2013) Angola Economic Update, June 2013, Issue 1, World Bank  
Available at: 
http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/Africa/Angola/angola-economic-
update-june-2013.pdf 
• World Bank (2014), Metadata 
Available at http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/reports/metadataview.aspx 
• World Bank Group, About Doing Business,  
Available at http://www.doingbusiness.org/about-us [seen 04/12/14] 
• World Bank Group, Rule of Law, Worldwide Governance Indicators  
Available at http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#doc 
• World Bank Group (2010) Enterprise Surveys - Angola 2010, 
Available at http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/data/exploreeconomies/2010/angola#corruption 
[Seen 10/12/14] 
• World Bank Group (2014), About us, Enterprise Survey 
Available at http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/About-Us [seen 07/12/14] 
• World Bank Group (2014) Doing Business: Economy Rankings,  
Available at http://www.doingbusiness.org/rankings [seen 04/12/14] 
World Bank Group (2014) Doing Business 2015, Going Beyond Efficiency, Economic Profile 
2015 Angola,, Available at 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/~/media/giawb/doing%20business/documents/profiles/country/A
GO.pdf 
• World Bank Group (2014) FAQs, Worldwide Governance Indicators 
Available at http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#faq [seen 28/11/14] 
87 
 
• World Bank Group (2014), Survey Methodology, Enterprise Surveys 
Available at http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/Methodology [seen 01/12/14] 
• World Fact Book (2014) Angola 
Available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ao.html  
• Wright, C. (2014) Inside Angola's Sovereign Wealth Fund, Forbes Magazine 
Available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/chriswright/2014/09/05/inside-angolas-sovereign-
wealth-fund/ [seen 16/12/2014] 
 
 
 
 
  
88 
 
 
315 pages from GPE course 
• Singh, Jewellord Nem & France Bourgouin. 2013. ‘Introduction: Resource Governance at a 
time of Plenty’ in Singh, Jewellord Nem & France Bourgouin (eds.): Resource Governance and 
Developmental States in the Global South: Critical International Political Economy 
Perspectives. Basingstoke, Palgrve Macmillan, p. 1-18 (18 pages). 
• Farooki, Masuma & Raphael Kaplinsky. 2012. The Impact of China on Global Commodity 
Prices: The Reshaping of the Resource Sector. Routledge, New York. Chapter 3, p. 47-69 (19 
pages) 
• Morrissey, O. (2012). FDI in Sub-Saharan Africa: Few Linkages, Fewer Spillovers. European 
Journal of Development Research, 24: 26-31 (5 pages).  
• P. Gibbon and S. Ponte (2005), Trading Down, Chapter 2 “The New International Trade 
Regime”(39 pages) 
• Gibbon and Ponte (2005), Trading Down, Chapter 1, “The age of capitalism” (33 pages) 
• R. Kaplinsky (2005), Globalization, Poverty and Inequality, Chapter 3 'Getting it Right: 
generating and appropriating rents' (in Part II Gaining from Globalization) (30 pages) 
• R. Kaplinsky (2005), Globalization, Poverty and Inequality, Chapter 6 'How does it all add up?' 
(in Part II Gaining from Globalization) (32 pages).  
• G. Gereffi (2014), Global Value Chains in a post-Washington Consensus World, Review of 
International Political Economy Vol. 21 No.1 pp.9-37. (28 pages).  
• 'World Development and International Finance since 1970', in Aid and Power (1995), eds. 
Mosley,Harrigan and Toye. London: Routledge (26 pages).  
• Schwartz, Herman M. 2010, 3rd edition, chapter 2 (20 pages).  
• Schwartz, Herman M. 2010, 3rd edition, chapter 4 (23 pages)  
• Schwartz, Herman M. 2010, 3rd edition, chapter 5 (19 pages)  
• Schwartz, Herman M. 2010, 3rd edition, chapter 6 (23 pages)  
89 
 
Appendix 
Name of Index Important 
Subcomponents 
(if any) 
Scale  Score for 
Angola 
In 2013 
Comparison 
to other Sub-
Saharan 
countries 
Freedom in the 
World/ 
Freedom House 
(Data from 
2013, published 
in 2014) 
Status 
(a) Freedom Rating 
(b) Civil Liberties 
(c) Political Rights 
 
I Electoral Process: 
II Political Pluralism 
and Participation:  
III Functioning of 
Government:  
IV Freedom of 
Expression and Belief: 
V Associational and 
Organizational Rights: 
VI Rule of Law:  
VII Personal 
Autonomy and 
Individual Rights 
Status: Free; 
Partly Free; 
Unfree  
 
a-c: 1: best; 7: 
worst 
 
I: 0-12 
II: 0-16 
III: 0-12 
IV: 0-16 
V: 0-12 
VI: 0-16 
VII: 0-16 
Unfree 
a: 5.5 
b: 5 
c: 6 
 
I: 4 
II: 6 
III: 1 
IV: 7 
V: 4 
VI: 4 
VII: 3 
Nigeria: partly 
free (all three 
categories: 4) 
 
Botswana: free 
(a: 2.5, b: 2, c: 
3)  
Index of 
Economic 
Freedom/ 
Heritage 
Foundation 
Rule of Law:  
(a): Property Rights 
(b): Freedom from 
Corruption 
Limited Government:  
(c): Government 
Spending 
0 (worst) – 100 
(best) 
In every 
category 
Overall score: 
47.3 (137th out 
of 178 
countries) 
A: 15.0 
B: 20.0 
C: 60.6 
Nigeria: 55.1 
(120th rank) 
Botswana: 
70.6 (30th 
rank)  
Worldwide 
Governance 
Index/ Project 
by the World 
Bank Group 
(a): Regulatory 
Quality  
(b): Government 
Effectiveness 
(c): Voice and 
Accountability 
-2.5 (worst) – 
2.5 (best) 
a: -1,05 
b: -1,26 
c: -1,12 
Nigeria: a:-
0,71; b:-1,01 ; 
c:-0,74 
 Botswana: a: 
0,66; b: 0,28; 
c: 0,47 
 
Strength of 
Legal Rights 
Index/ World 
Bank 
- 0 (weak) – 12 
(strong) 
1 Nigeria: 6 
Botswana: 5 
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Corruption 
Perception 
Index/ 
Transparency 
International 
 0 (highly 
corrupt) – 100 
(very clean) 
23 
 
(153rd rank out 
of 175) 
Nigeria: 25 
(144th 
worldwide) 
Botswana: 64 
(30th 
worldwide)  
Doing Business 
Project/ World 
Bank 
Overall: Easy of 
Doing Business 
A: Starting a Business 
B: Dealing With 
construction permits 
C: Getting electricity 
D: Registering 
property 
E: Getting credit 
F: Protecting Minority 
Investors 
G: Paying Taxes 
H: Trading Across 
Borders 
I: Enforcing Contracts 
J: Resolving 
Insolvency 
From 1-189 in 
overall ranking 
and 
subcomponents 
Overall: 181 
A: 174 
B: 67 
C: 157 
D: 164 
E: 180 
F: 94 
G: 144 
H: 167 
I: 187 
J: 189 
Nigeria: 
Overall: 170 
Botswana: 
Overall: 74 
Fragile States 
Index/ Fund 
For Peace 
 (a) State Legitimacy 
(b) Human Rights 
and Rule of Law 
Overall rating 
categories:  
Sustainable, 
stable, warning, 
alert 
(worldwide 
ranking: the 
higher the 
country score, 
the better) 
A-D: 1 (best) – 
10 (worst) 
Overall: 
Warning;-43th 
worldwide 
 
A: 8.6 
B: 7.3 
Nigeria: Alert 
– 19th 
worldwide 
Botswana: 
Between 
“Warning” and 
“Stable” – 
121st 
worldwide 
 
